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Abstract 
 
With the completion of the acquisition of Dundee Wealth on February 1, 2011, 
Scotiabank now has two full-service investment broker-dealers – ScotiaMcLeod and 
DWM Securities.  Each firm is pursuing a different strategy in order to attract the right 
advisors and the right clients. This paper addresses the questions of whether to retain, 
merge, or sell the DWM Securities brand; whether to keep both the Independent Agent 
and the Employee advisor models; and what customer segment(s) should be targeted – 
status quo (affluent plus high net worth) or high net worth focus only.  A thoughtful 
analysis of the external environment, in particular advisor segments and customer 
segments, produced several alternatives for consideration.  After further analysis, I 
recommend that the DWM Securities brand be retained along with both advisor models, 
and that a high net worth customer strategic focus be implemented for ScotiaMcLeod 
only. 
 
Keywords:  full-service broker-dealer; Independent Agent advisor; Employee advisor; 
affluent; high net worth.  
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Glossary 
 
Term Definition 
Advisor Managed A discretionary account where the AUM 
are directly managed by the advisor. 
AUM Assets under management - The market 
value of assets being managed on behalf of 
investors. 
Big Six A name given to the six largest banks in 
Canada. 
BNS Bank of Nova Scotia (or Scotiabank) 
Centre of Influence Influential people who are willing to 
provide sales a lead. 
CFO Chief Financial Officer – Primarily 
responsible for managing financial risk, 
financial planning, record keeping, and 
reporting. 
Commercial Banking Providing services, such as: accepting 
deposits, giving loans, brokering 
investments, etc., to businesses. 
Commission A service charge assessed by a broker of 
investment advisor in return for providing 
investment advice and/or handling the 
purchase or sale of a security. 
Discount Broker A stockbroker who carries out buy and sell 
orders at a reduced commission compared 
to a full-service broker, but provides no 
investment advice. 
Discretionary Portfolio Management Client allows a broker to act on his/her 
behalf to make certain types of trades 
without prior consent from the client. 
DWMS Dundee Wealth Management Securities 
Fee-Based Account An investment account in which the 
advisor’s compensation is based on a set 
percentage of the client’s assets instead of 
on commissions. 
Financial Advisor One who provides financial advice or 
guidance to customers in return for 
compensation.  In Canada, financial 
 xiii 
Term Definition 
advisors are MFDA regulated and 
primarily provide financial planning and 
mutual funds. 
Financial Institution An establishment that focuses on dealing 
with financial transactions, such as 
investments, loans, and deposits (i.e. banks, 
trust companies, insurance companies, and 
investment dealers). 
Financial Planning A comprehensive evaluation of an 
investor’s current and future financial state 
to determine if a person’s financial goals 
can be met, and what steps need to be taken 
to ensure that they are. 
FC Fixed Cost(s) – Fixed costs are business 
expenses that are not dependent on the 
level of goods/services produced. 
Full-Service Investment Broker-Dealer A broker that provides a large variety of 
services to its clients, including research 
and advice, retirement planning, tax tips, 
and much more.  Commissions are much 
higher than those at discount brokers. 
HNW High Net Worth – A classification used by 
the financial services industry to denote an 
individual or a family with high net worth, 
which is generally quoted in terms of liquid 
assets above a certain dollar amount. 
IIROC Investment Industry Regulatory 
Organization of Canada, which oversees all 
investment dealers and trading activity on 
debt and equity marketplaces in Canada. 
Investable Assets Liquid assets that you can invest (e.g. 
cash). 
Investment Advice Any recommendation or guidance that 
attempts to educate, inform, or guide an 
investor regarding a particular investment 
product or series of products. 
Investment Advisors Any person or group that makes investment 
recommendations or conducts securities 
analysis in return for a fee.  In Canada 
investment advisors are IIROC regulated. 
Investment Banking A specific division of banking related to 
the creation of capital for other companies.  
Investment banks underwrite securities for 
corporations and aid in the sale of 
securities to investors.  They also facilitate 
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Term Definition 
mergers and acquisitions. 
Investment Management A generic term that most commonly refers 
to the buying and selling of investments 
within a portfolio.  It can be done either by 
the consumer or a professional, and can be 
passive, active, aggressive, or conservative. 
Load A sales charge or commission charged to 
an investor in the purchase or sale of a 
mutual fund.  The investor pays the load, 
which goes to compensate a sales 
intermediary (i.e. financial advisor, 
investment advisor, etc.). 
Loss Leader A product/service sold at a low price (at 
cost or below cost) to stimulate other 
profitable sales. 
Managed Assets Assets under discretionary management. 
MFDA Mutual Fund Dealer Association of Canada 
is the national self-regulatory organization 
for the distribution side of the Canadian 
mutual fund industry. 
Mutual Funds An investment vehicle that is made up of a 
pool of funds collected from many 
investors for the purpose of investing in 
securities such as stocks, bonds, money 
market instruments, etc. 
No-Load No sales charge or commission in the 
purchase/sale of a mutual fund. 
Operating Leverage Operating leverage is a measure of how 
revenue growth translates into growth in 
operating income.  It is a measure of 
leverage, and of how risky a company’s 
operating income is.  A business that has a 
higher proportion of fixed costs to variable 
costs is said to have used more operating 
leverage; businesses with lower fixed costs 
and higher variable costs are said to 
employ less operating leverage.  One 
measure for operating leverage = FC/VC. 
Retail Banking Providing services, such as: accepting 
deposits, giving loans, brokering 
investments, etc., to individuals. 
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) A financial measure that quantifies how 
well a company/industry generates cash 
flow relative to the capital invested.  It is 
defined as net operating income less 
 xv 
Term Definition 
adjusted taxes, divided by invested capital, 
and is usually expressed as a percentage. 
SM ScotiaMcLeod 
VC Variable Cost(s) – Variable costs are 
expenses that change in proportion to the 
activity of a business. 
Wealth Management A professional service, which is the 
combination of financial/investment 
advice, accounting/tax services, and 
legal/estate planning.  In general, wealth 
management is more than just investment 
advice, as it can encompass all parts of a 
person’s financial life. 
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1 Introduction 
 
On February 1, 2011, Scotiabank (BNS) completed its acquisition of Dundee 
Wealth from the Goodman-family-controlled Dundee Corporation.   As a result of this 
acquisition, BNS will become the fourth largest mutual fund provider in Canada, and the 
third largest among the country’s leading banks.1  The deal, while not unexpected, came 
more quickly than anticipated, and appears to have been put together hastily; as such, 
many details still need to be worked out. 
Much of the focus has been on how BNS will integrate Dundee Wealth’s 
investment management business, specifically Dynamic Mutual Funds, into its own 
wealth management business.  Of lesser note however, is that with the acquisition, BNS 
now has two retail full-service investment broker-dealer2 platforms – ScotiaMcLeod 
(SM) and DWM Securities (DWMS).  While both SM and DWMS offer many of the 
same products and services, each platform offers its respective advisors a different 
advisor model – DWMS provides an Independent Agent model, while SM provides an 
Employee model3. 
This paper will focus on the integration of SM and DWMS, and will look at the 
issue from the corporate (BNS’s) perspective.  As part of the analysis, the interests of all 
stakeholders - clients, investing public, management, shareholders, and advisors – will be 
taken into consideration.  In particular, this paper will initially address the following 
questions: 
• Should BNS retain the DWMS brand? 
                                                
1 Based on figures reported by the Investment Funds Institute of Canada (IFIC). 
2 Broker and dealer will be used interchangeably/synonymously throughout this paper; technically, a broker 
is only an agent who executes orders on behalf of clients, whereas a dealer acts as a principal and trades for 
his/her own account.  Most brokerages act as both brokers and principals, so the term broker-dealer is 
commonly used to describe them. 
3 The Employee model is typical within the bank-owned broker-dealer firms where investment advisors 
receive lower payouts in exchange for more operational and cost support (e.g. premises, technology, staff, 
marketing, back office, etc.).  The Independent Agent model offers higher payouts to advisors, but the 
advisor is responsible for most of the operational decisions and costs listed above.   
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• Should BNS offer advisors both the Independent Agent model and the 
Employee model? 
 
This paper, including the Introduction is divided into five sections.  Section 2 will 
provide an overview of BNS and the subsidiaries in question including current position, 
performance, and any current issues or problems.  Section 3 will be an external analysis 
to identify relevant industry players, opportunities and threats facing the industry, sources 
of competitive advantage, how firms stack up against the sources of advantage, and the 
strengths and weaknesses of BNS, SM, and DWMS.  Section 4 will outline strategic 
alternatives to the questions posed above, along with other options BNS should consider 
to exploit opportunities and strengths while mitigating any weaknesses and threats.  
Finally, Section 5 summarizes the feasibility of each option and concludes with a 
recommended alternative.   
 3 
2 Organizational Overview 
 
2.1 Scotiabank 
 
Scotiabank (BNS-T) is one of North America’s premier financial institutions, and 
Canada’s most ‘international bank’4.  Founded in 1832 and headquartered in Canada, 
the bank employs over 75,000 people worldwide, and offers a diverse range of products 
and services to some 18.6 million customers, in more than 50 countries.  BNS is divided 
into four business lines: 
• Canadian Banking – Canadian Banking provides a diverse range of financial 
advice, solutions and services to more than 7.6 million retail, small business, 
and commercial clients, through a network of roughly 1,000 branches, 3,000 
automated banking machines (ABM’s), as well as telephone and internet 
banking, and third-party channels. 
• International Banking – International Banking encompasses BNS’s retail and 
commercial banking operations in more than 45 countries outside Canada – 
48,000 employees, 11 million customers, a network of approximately 2,000 
branches/offices and 3,700 ABM’s, as well as telephone and Internet banking, 
in-store banking kiosks, and specialized sales forces. 
• Global Banking and Markets – Global Banking and Markets is the wholesale 
banking arm of the bank, providing investment banking products and services 
to corporate, government, and institutional clients around the world. 
• Global Wealth Management – Global Wealth Management combines wealth 
management and insurance services in Canada and internationally to affluent 
and high net-worth clients. 
 
Scotiabank’s framework for success involves: 
                                                
4 Canadian financial institutions have a global reputation for stability. 
 4 
• Executing its “Five-Point Strategy”; 
o Sustainable and profitable revenue growth 
o Capital and balance sheet management 
o Leadership 
o Prudent risk management and appetite 
o Efficiency and expense management 
• Fostering a culture of collaboration; 
• Living its values of integrity, respect, commitment, and spirit; 
• All with a core purpose to be the best at helping customers become financially 
better off by providing practical advice and relevant solutions. 
 
2.2 ScotiaMcLeod 
 
Four young entrepreneurs originally formed ScotiaMcLeod in 1921 as a 
partnership: Donald McLeod, William Young, James Weir and John Ratcliffe.  By the 
1970’s, McLeod Young Weir offered a full range of investment banking services 
including: bond, stock, and money market trading; corporate and government finance; 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A); commodities and futures; personal investment services; 
and mutual funds.  In 1987, BNS purchased McLeod Young Weir.   
Today, ScotiaMcLeod is Canada’s fourth largest retail full-service brokerage, 
with over 750 advisors (plus 1,100 support staff) serving roughly 150,000 client 
households in more than 88 branches/sub-branches across the country.  SM’s vision is “to 
be the leader at winning and retaining primary advisor relationships”.  SM’s mission is to 
offer investment advice and money management.  Investment advisors are able to offer a 
full range of investment products; and through SM’s Team of Experts5, advisors are able 
to offer comprehensive wealth management or planning services such as retirement 
planning, financial planning, will & estate planning, tax strategies, maximizing retirement 
income, philanthropy, and business planning. 
                                                
5 Scotiabank provides teams of salaried wealth management specialists who support advisors in different 
regions.  
 5 
ScotiaMcLeod’s strategy is based on: 
• Objectives: 
o Retain and attract more right advisors 
o Market and deliver strong value propositions 
o Create more capacity to grow, and reduce cost to serve 
• Scope: 
o Affluent and high net worth clients 
• Means: 
o Growth support – growth bonus, Growth Council/Club 
o Advisor training programs 
o Experienced recruiting 
o Centre of influence programs 
o “Second Opinion” campaign 
o Referral programs 
o “Team of Experts” 
o Increased collaboration between and within business lines 
o Technology 
 
For entrepreneurial-spirited investment advisors, SM offers a small, boutique firm 
feel, with the strength and brand of BNS backing them up.  The platform for advisors is 
an Employee model, where advisors are compensated through a combination of salary, 
commissions, growth bonus, partnership program (revenue sharing), and benefits.  
Commission pay-outs can be up to 51% of annual gross revenue, and are determined by a 
grid, which is dependent on: advisor experience, total gross annual revenue, and type of 
revenue (e.g. fee-based, transactional).  
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2.3 Dundee Wealth 
 
Since its creation in 1998, Dundee Wealth (DW-T) has used strategic acquisitions 
to expand its investment management and advisory businesses by finding new 
distribution partners in key growth territories.  The goal was to create a diversified and 
fully integrated wealth management business combining product development, 
investment management, and distribution that could leverage the strengths that each of 
those businesses afforded the others.   
Dundee Wealth is headquartered in Toronto, Ontario, and through its partners and 
subsidiaries, employs over 1,200 people in North America and Europe.  DW creates and 
provides investment solutions and advisory services for financial advisors, institutions, 
corporations, and foundations through two main businesses: 
• Investment Management - Dynamic Funds is an award-winning family of 
funds designed to provide investors with a full spectrum of investment 
solutions. 
• Financial Advisory - DWM Securities offer investors a comprehensive 
selection of financial services and products that are distributed through a 
network of approximately 1,200 independent advisors.  DWMS is a full-
service retail broker and a member of the Investment Industry Regulatory 
Organization of Canada (IIROC)6.  Advisors are able to provide a suite of 
products and services to investors, similar to those offered by SM.  DWMS 
offers advisors an Independent Agent business model where advisors can earn 
commission pay-outs up to 85% of annual gross revenue, but are responsible 
for all their own operational and marketing costs. 
 
In summary, as a result of the acquisition of DW, BNS now has two successful 
retail full-service investment dealer platforms, and has just started to address the 
questions posed in the Introduction.  The next section will provide an external analysis, 
                                                
6 IIROC is the national self-regulatory organization that oversees all investment dealers and trading activity 
on debt and equity marketplaces in Canada. 
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essentially a SWOT analysis, which will identify SM’s and DWMS’s key strengths and 
weaknesses, and the opportunities and threats facing the organization(s).  This will serve 
as a basis for developing, evaluating, and selecting the organization(s)’ strategic options, 
within the context of BNS’s framework for success. 
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3 External Analysis 
 
3.1 Industry Overview 
 
The Canadian securities industry plays a key role in Canada’s financial services 
sector.  It enables businesses and governments to raise debt and equity capital, and allows 
investors to trade with confidence in open and fair capital markets.  The industry is 
regulated at the national (IIROC and MFDA7) and provincial/territorial level; and the 
exchanges (e.g. the Toronto Stock Exchange) play an important regulatory role as well. 
Canada’s securities industry dates back to 1832, when shares of Canada’s first 
railroad were traded by a small group of brokers in a Montreal coffee house.  The 
chartered banks became the first and leading underwriters of Canadian securities.  They 
maintained their lead for many years; however, by the turn of the 20th century, their 
dominance in underwriting had been diminished by the increasing number of specialized 
underwriting firms.  By 1927, about sixty percent of securities issued were underwritten 
by five investment dealers and one bank, with the five dealers accounting for 47% of the 
total. 
Until the late 1980’s, most of the independent securities firms were owned by 
their senior partners, a structure that became increasingly difficult to maintain due to 
increasing demands for capital, growing global competition, greater market volatility, and 
cyclical earnings performance.  In the mid-1980’s, the federal and provincial 
governments introduced legislative changes to open up ownership of the securities 
industry to Canadian banks and trust companies, as well as foreign securities firms.  In 
order to enter the retail brokerage sector and to strengthen their activities in investment 
banking, five of the ‘Big Six’8 banks acquired major investment dealers, while the sixth 
                                                
7 The Mutual Fund Dealers Association of Canada (MFDA) is the national self-regulatory organization for 
the distribution side of the Canadian mutual fund industry. 
8 The six largest banks in Canada. 
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built its own brokerage from the ground up; today, all of Canada’s large integrated 
securities firms are bank-owned. 
The securities industry is made of integrated, institutional and retail firms.  
Integrated firms offer products and services that cover all aspects of the industry, 
including both institutional and retail markets.  Institutional firms provide services to 
pension funds, insurance companies, mutual fund organizations, banks, and trust 
companies; while retail firms, which include full-service firms and discount brokers, 
offer a wide range of products and services to retail investors.  For this paper, the 
industry context for comparison and discussion will be confined to the full-service 
retail brokerage industry (IIROC member investment dealer firms).   
Table 3.1 lists the suite of products and services a retail full-service investment 
dealer firm generally provides to its clients: 
 
Table 3.1 - Full-Service Broker-Dealer Products and Services 
Products Services 
• Common and preferred stocks 
• Bonds 
• Options and futures 
• Commodities 
• Mutual funds and ETF’s 
• New issues 
• Alternative investment strategies 
• Insurance 
 
• Research/advice 
• Financial planning 
• Tax planning 
• Retirement planning 
• Succession planning 
• Wealth protection 
• Estate planning 
• Charitable giving 
• Discretionary portfolio management 
• Personal relationship 
 
 
The current industry business model used to deliver retail full-service brokerage 
services and products to investors is through investment advisors; however, there are a 
number of intermediaries before the investor, including custodians, broker-dealer firms, 
investment banks, and securities issuers. 
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3.2 Industry Value Chain 
 
Private and public sector organizations raise needed capital by issuing debt and 
equity securities, which are underwritten by investment banks.  Investment banks then 
sell these securities, along with research, to retail, corporate, and institutional investors 
through broker-dealer firms. These transactions are cleared and settled by the securities 
exchanges, and the domestic or foreign securities are held at a custodian bank in the 
home market or global custodian, respectively. 
 
Figure 3.1 - Industry Value Chain 
 
Source: European Central Bank, “The Securities Custody Industry”, Occasional Paper Series, Number 68/August 2007 
 
The securities industry today revolves around processing and dissemination of 
information on the one hand, and providing liquidity, financing, or yield-enhancing 
solutions on the other.  Doing both functions well requires large investments in 
information technology.  This technology must continuously be adapted to changes in 
13
ECB 
Occasional Paper No 68
August 2007
Figure 2 Securities services value chain
Local & Global 
Custodians
CustodyClearing
Securities
Finance &
Collateral
Mgmt
Fund
Services 
Paying
Agent
Services
Issuance
Securities
Origination Research Execution
Trade Post-Trade
Settlement
Purchaser of Service Supplier of Service
Intermediaries 1):
Investment Banks
Brokers & Prime 
Brokers
Institutional Investors:
Collective Investment 
Funds,Hedge Funds,
Pension Funds,
Insurance Companies
Securities Issuers:
Corporates,Financial 
Institutions, Public 
Sector Organisations
Retail & Corporate 
Investors
1) An intermediary may purchase and supply multiple services in the value chain, sometimes via different subsidiaries. A supplier may 
purchase services from a higher-tier intermediary.
domestic business. Their customer base 
typically requires more in-depth local market 
expertise, proximity to local market 
infrastructures, and may also place a high 
importance in being able to select different 
providers in each market based on relationship, 
service and price.  
Global custodians: This group of custodians 
offers a one-stop-shop service, usually covering 
about 100 markets, and opts to appoint 
intermediaries to access many markets’ CSDs. 
They are able to capture cross-border custody 
business without incurring substantial set-up 
costs and ongoing fixed costs. Most global 
custodians began as large single-market 
custodians and expanded their market coverage 
to capture their domestic clients’ investments 
abroad. The global custodian business model 
appeals mainly to institutional investors which 
need convenience and consolidated reporting 
on their diverse international portfolio. In some 
larger markets, some global custodians may 
establish a physical presence and become direct 
members of the CSDs. In most cases, however, 
they appoint either a multi-direct or a single-
market provider in the local market to be their 
“sub-custodian”.
It is worth noting that outside the US, a 
significant share of the custody business is still 
performed by commercial banks, savings or 
cooperative banks to support their retail, 
brokerage and asset manager (intra-group) 
business.   
Table 2 lists the major global custodians which 
have specialised in third-party services. It shows 
that this business tends to be concentrated on 
some key players due to the economies of scale.
Table 3 lists the geographical coverage of 
multi-direct custodians in the various regions. 
The countries have been taken into account 
only when the custodian is a direct member of 
the CSD in that country. The institutions listed 
may also be global custodians and their 
geographical coverage, including both direct 
and indirect membership for a given market, 
usually amounts to 70-100 countries. 
1 THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE 
CUSTODY INDUSTRY
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market practice, industry standards, legal requirements, and fiscal processes.  These 
changes are driving up fixed costs and shrinking margins, resulting not only in 
further investment in technology, but industry consolidation, and vertical 
integration. 
 
3.3 Industry Trends 
 
The following figure highlights trends in Canadian wealth management in 
general, including the retail full-service broker-dealer industry: 
 
Figure 3.2 - Canadian Wealth Management Trends 
 
Source: Capgemini (2005), “Canadian Wealth Management Market 2004/2005 Report” 
 
Investors today are more sophisticated and knowledgeable, and want better 
professional advice.  Firms and advisors are targeting multiple customer segments; and 
given recent economic and capital market trials and tribulations, firms and advisors 
are transitioning from transaction-based revenue, to fees based on AUM in order to 
• Investors	  are	  demanding	  more	  sophisticated	  products/services	  
• Focus	  on	  client	  growth	  and	  retention	  • Vertical	  integration	  of	  wealth	  management	  players	  
• Increasing	  holistic	  focus	  on	  long-­‐term	  household	  planning	  • Market	  growth	  and	  reliance	  on	  advisors	  
• Investment	  in	  Advisor	  workstations	  • Transition	  from	  transaction	  to	  annualized	  fees	  
Operational	  Trends	   Investor/Customer	  Trends	  
Product	  Trends	  Provider/Supplier	  Trends	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generate higher, more stable revenues.  To improve operational efficiency and free-
up more time for client acquisition and retention, firms and advisors are investing 
more money in technology.  Following is a more detailed analysis of these trends. 
 
3.4 Competitors 
 
The full-service broker industry currently consists of roughly 200 firms 
nationally,9 and roughly 10,000 investment advisors.10  Broker-dealer organizations can 
be divided into four distinct groups/clusters based on scope or type of investor served, 
national distribution, and independence: 
• Boutiques (e.g. Richardson GMP, Wellington West) may be national or 
regional, and offer an Employee model that compensates advisors based on a 
revenue grid.  The grid does not generally distinguish between the types of 
revenue (e.g. transactional, fee-based, etc.). 
• Regional Independents (e.g. Odlum Brown, Leede Financial) only distribute 
products and services within certain regions (e.g. Western Canada, Eastern 
Canada).  They offer advisors an Employee model that compensates advisors 
based on a revenue grid, which may or may not distinguish between revenue 
types, and treat these types differently. 
• National Independents (e.g. Raymond James, Canaccord Financial, Edward 
Jones) are generally part of an integrated investment-banking firm.  Firms 
such as Raymond James and Canaccord Financial offer advisors a higher pay-
out Employee model, as well as an Independent Agent model. 
• Bank-Owned Broker-Dealers (i.e. ScotiaMcLeod, BMO Nesbit Burns, TD 
Waterhouse PIA, RBC Dominion Securities, CIBC Wood Gundy, National 
Bank Financial) have the largest scale and are part of fully integrated 
(vertically/horizontally) banks.  Advisors are compensated based on the 
Employee model. 
                                                
9 IIROC 
10 Investor Economics (2010) “The Retail Brokerage Report – Spring 2010” 
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Market share in terms of AUM is concentrated in the bank-owned cluster, with 
RBC Dominion Securities ranked as number one.  The ‘Big Six’ owned dealer firms 
control over 70% of AUM; the top 10 firms, including the national independents, control 
over 85% of AUM11.  The boutiques and regional independents have 15% of the market.  
Of note, is that the national independents and boutiques, while controlling a lower 
percentage of AUM, appear to be growing AUM at a higher rate, which is illustrated 
in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2 - Full-Service Brokerage Asset Ranking12 
 
Source: Investor Economics (2010), “The Retail Brokerage Report – Spring 2010” 
 
                                                
11 Investor Economics (2010), “The Retail Brokerage Report – Spring 2010” 
12 Reproduced with the permission of Investor Economics.  Any and all conclusions drawn from this table 
for the purpose of this paper are that of the author(s) and not of Investor Economics. 
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3.2 Full-service Brokerage Asset Ranking
 Ranked by assets in billions of dollars, three-month growth rates and asset change
Dec 2009Mar 2010
3-mo 
growth rate
3-mo
asset change
Growth rank
Full-service brokerage assets $715 $694 3.1% $21 
 RBC Dominion Securities 1 1 10 1
 CIBC Wood Gundy 2 2 12 3
 BMO Nesbitt Burns 3 3 8 2
 ScotiaMcLeod 4 4 11 4
 TD Waterhouse Private Investment Advice 5 5 9 5
 Top 5 $497 $483 2.9% $14 
    Market share 69.4% 69.5%  
 National Bank Financial 6 6 13 6
 Dundee Securities 7 7 5 8
 Desjardins Securities 8 8 7 9
 Raymond James 9 9 2 7
 HSBC Securities 10 10 6 11
 Top 10 $614 $595 3.1% $18 
    Market share 85.8% 85.8%  
 Canaccord Financial 11 11 3 10
 Macquarie Private Wealth 12 12 4 12
 Wellington West 13 13 14 14
 Odlum Brown 14 14 15 15
 Credential Securities 15 15 16 16
 ATB Securities 16 16 1 13
 Figure 3.3 shows the asset mix in the full-service brokerage channel. Valuations and investment flows resulted 
in a decrease in the share of cash and equivalents and a shift in mix toward market-sensitive asset classes. In 
the quarter ended March 2009, cash made up 8% of all assets. A year later this share was down to 5%. The 
opposite can be said of equities, which went from a 37% share in Q1 2009 to a 44% share at the end of 
the most recent quarter. Fixed income assets, which grew at 1.2% during the quarter, have also seen a slight 
decrease in their level of importance, while mutual funds remained at a 27% share over the past year.
Full-service brokers $573  $694  $715  3.1% 24.8%
 Cash and equivalents 46 39 38 -3.8% -18.4%
 Fixed income 162 167 169 1.2% 4.3%
 Mutual funds* 151 188 194 2.9% 28.0%
 Equities 211 296 311 5.2% 47.5%
 Other 2 3 3 -5.0% 60.3%
*Mutual fund component includes assets in fund wraps.
Mar 2010 3-mo Yr/yr 
3.3 Full-service Brokerage Asset Mix
 In billions of dollars
Assets
Dec 2009Mar 2009
Growth

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The bank-owned broker firms also control, on average, the larger investment 
accounts, but once again, it is the national independents that appear to be growing 
average account size at a higher rate.  Also of note, is that HSBC Securities, which is 
part of a large multi-national bank, controls on average the largest investment accounts 
(see Table 3.3). 
 
Table 3.3 - Full-Service Brokerage Average Account Size13 
 
Source: Investor Economics (2010), “The Retail Brokerage Report – Spring 2010” 
 
 
 
                                                
13 Reproduced with the permission of Investor Economics.  Any and all conclusions drawn from this table 
for the purpose of this paper are that of the author(s) and not of Investor Economics. 
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3.7 Full-service Brokerage Average Account Size
 Ranked by average account size in thousands of dollars
Account size rank
Dec 2009Mar 2010
3-mo 
growth rate
Growth rank
Full-service brokers $126.2 $124.0 1.8%
 HSBC Securities 1 1 15
 RBC Dominion Securities 2 2 12
 CIBC Wood Gundy 3 3 7
 TD Waterhouse Private Investment Advice 4 4 10
 BMO Nesbitt Burns 5 5 6
 Top 5 $190.2 $187.8 1.3%
   
 ScotiaMcLeod 6 6 13
 Odlum Brown 7 7 11
 Wellington West 8 9 9
 National Bank Financial 9 8 14
 ATB Securities 10 10 16
 Next 5 $138.2 $136.4 1.3%
   
 Desjardins Securities 11 11 8
 Raymond James 12 12 2
 Credential Securities 13 13 5
 Dundee Securities 14 14 4
 Macquarie Private Wealth 15 15 3
 Canaccord Financial 16 16 1
3.8  Quarterly Trades per Account at Full-service Brokerages
FULL-SERVICE BROKERS
Mar 2008 Jun 2008 Sep 2008 Dec 2008 Mar 2009 Jun 2009 Sep 2009 Dec 2009 Mar 2010
1.99 1.98
1.75
2.02 2.00
2.32
1.87
2.10
2.20
3.8 Quarterly Trades per Account at Full-service Brokerages
Spring 2007The Retail Brokerage ReportPage 8 of 23
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3.5 Customers 
 
As previously mentioned in the industry value chain analysis and industry trends 
analysis (Sections 3.2 and 3.3), industry costs are trending higher.  The response by 
brokerage firms, and advisors in particular, has been, in part, to increase productivity by 
targeting fewer, but larger customer accounts.  To focus their efforts, the market has 
generally been divided into four distinct groups as shown in Table 3.4: 
 
Table 3.4 - Customer Segments14 
Segment Definition People 
(000’s) 
% of 
Population 
$Billions % of 
Market 
Pre-Mass 
Affluent Under $100k 5,265 17.0 108 6.1 
Mass 
Affluent $100k-$1MM 
1,897 6.1 513 29.0 
High Net 
Worth $1MM-$20MM 
444 1.4 852 48.2 
Ultra High 
Net Worth Over $20MM 
7 < 1 296 16.7 
Total  7,613  1,769  
Source: Capgemini (2005), “The Canadian Wealth Management Market 2004/2005 Report” 
 
Customer segments are adopting the investment behaviours and demands of the 
segments above them, seeking more sophisticated products and services (see Figure 3.3).  
The higher customer segments can be used as a leading indicator for lower customer 
segments. 
  
                                                
14 Reproduced with the permission of Franklin Templeton.  Any and all conclusions drawn from this table 
for the purpose of this paper are that of the author(s) and not of Franklin Templeton.  This paper will treat 
high net worth and ultra-high net worth as one customer segment. 
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Figure 3.3 - Customer Preferences and Behaviours 
 
Source: Capgemini (2005), “Canadian Wealth Management Market 2004/2005 Report” 
 
While all customer segments may want the same products and services, not all 
customers segments offer broker-dealer firms and advisors the same opportunity to 
improve productivity.  According to industry researcher, Investor Economics, the 
number of HNW households in Canada is set to double by 2018.  At the end of 2009, 
Canada had more than 550,000 high net worth (HNW) people.  AUM of HNW people 
totalled roughly $1.7 trillion, which was marginally higher from the $1.6 trillion in AUM 
at the end of 2007.  Assuming there is reasonable economic growth, it is estimated that by 
2018, there will be approximately 900,000 HNW people with at least $1,000,000 in 
investable assets.15 
As shown in Figure 3.4, the wealthier customer segments are growing at the 
fastest rate; so brokerage firms and advisors are increasingly targeting them in order to 
improve productivity.  Firms/advisors are able to generate more revenue for the same 
amount of work (or the same amount of revenue for less work) by targeting HNW 
customers vs. affluent customers.  In order to attract HNW investors, more research is 
being directed towards understanding what they want. 
 
                                                
15 Advisor.ca (2011), “HNW Report: What wealth wants” 
Institutions	  	  Ultra	  High	  Net	  Worth	  	  High	  Net	  Worth	  	  Mass	  AfIluent	  Pull	  fro
m	  clien
t	  behav
iours	  
Provider	  push	  
 17 
Figure 3.4 - Growth in HNW Households16 
 
Source: Capgemini (2005), “The Canadian Wealth Management Market 2004/2005 Report” 
 
According to Capgemini, in their report: “The Canadian Wealth Management 
Market 2004/2005”, 7.5% of the population in Canada controls over 90% of investable 
assets; the top 1.5% of the population controls over 65% of investable assets.  As Figure 
3.5 shows, HNW investors over the age of 60 control 50% of total investable assets; 
Canadians over age 70 represent almost a third of the HNW market.  
  
                                                
16 Reproduced with the permission of Franklin Templeton.  Any and all conclusions drawn from this figure 
for the purpose of this paper are that of the author(s) and not of Franklin Templeton. 
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Figure 3.5 - Percentage of HNW People/Assets by Age Group17 
 
Source: Capgemini (2005), “The Canadian Wealth Management Market 2004/2005 Report” 
 
How do HNW investors choose an advisor?  Performance - but performance is 
only one of several factors.  In order of importance, these other factors are:18 
• Brand/reputation 
• Transparency 
• Quality of interaction/relationship 
• Proactive and deep insight about needs 
• Product/service breadth 
• Communication of processes 
• Disciplined investment style 
• Research capabilities 
• Product/service specialties 
• Retention of talent 
 
                                                
17 Reproduced with the permission of Franklin Templeton.  Any and all conclusions drawn from this figure 
for the purpose of this paper are that of the author(s) and not of Franklin Templeton. 
18 Economist Intelligence Unit (2008), “High-net-worth investors and asset managers: Bridging the gap” 
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While investment management services are important, they are only part of the 
complete wealth management suite.  Canadian HNW investors are challenging their 
advisors to deliver more than just investment advice; the list of planning services 
increasingly being sought after includes: 
• Portfolio management 
• Retirement planning 
• Tax planning 
• Inheritance/estate plans 
• Trust planning and administration 
• Next generation mentoring 
• Succession planning 
 
The reasons HNW investors cited most for terminating the services of an 
advisor/firm were: 
• Change in strategy/allocation 
• Performance 
• Change in family situation 
• Outgrowing advisor 
 
3.5.1 Summary of Customer Opportunities and Threats 
 
In short, all investors want their own CFO who can provide them with more 
planning; and are willing and able to change brokerage firms and advisors in order to get 
it.  Table 3.5 summarizes possible customer opportunities and threats. 
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Table 3.5 - Summary of Customer Opportunities and Threats 
Opportunities Threats 
• Targeting HNW prospects will allow 
firms and advisors to be more 
productive. 
• Firms/advisors who can deliver more 
without significantly increasing costs 
will have an advantage. 
• The 50-59 and 40-49 customer 
segments are the second and third 
largest customer segments in terms of 
percentage of HNW people and 
percentage of HNW assets, 
respectively.  These two customer 
segments have longer investing time 
horizons and they likely have more 
(unmet) needs; therefore, there is more 
opportunity to add value and earn 
revenue; they also stand to inherit 
substantial wealth from the Over Age 
70 customer segment. 
• HNW investors are asking for more 
service and products, and may be 
willing to pay more. 
 
• Canadian investors as a whole are 
challenging their advisors/firm to 
deliver more; to do so may entail higher 
costs and lower margins. 
• Unmet needs are going to be met by 
another advisor/firm. 
• While the Over Age 70 customer 
segment represents the highest 
percentage of HNW people and 
percentage of HNW assets, they also 
have the shortest investing time 
horizons and most likely have most, if 
not all, of their planning needs met. 
 
3.6 Suppliers 
 
Investment advisors are considered both customers (buyers of research, execution, 
back office operations, etc.) and suppliers to the full-service brokerage channel19 of 
product and service distribution; however, this paper will analyse advisors as 
suppliers. 
After a tumultuous few years, in which advisors suffered then began to recover 
from the global financial crisis, it appears that it’s full speed ahead for the foreseeable 
future.  Although the crisis hit all parts of the financial services industry, the full-service 
                                                
19 A substitute to the full-service broker-dealer channel and posing an increasing threat of entry is the 
financial advisory channel, which has historically offered financial planning and mutual funds.  Advisors 
who work in the full-service channel are commonly referred to as investment advisors, while those that 
work in the financial advisory channel are commonly referred to as financial advisors. 
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brokerage channel suffered the biggest blow among the various front-line retail 
investment businesses.  Advisors in other channels didn’t have quite the same level of 
exposure to the markets, so didn’t suffer as acutely when the markets went into the tank.  
Advisors in the financial advisor, banking, and insurance channels, for which the margin 
of safety may be perceived to be greater, may have taken some share of Canadian wallets 
from brokers. 
Investment advisors are the major suppliers to the full-service brokerage 
channel, and the largest cost - up to 85% of gross revenues in the case of independent 
broker-dealers firms where advisors are on the Independent Agent model.  Investor 
Economics segments advisors into two broad segments based on the 80/20 rule: 
• The top 20% of producers in terms of AUM per client 
• The remaining 80% 
 
Isolating the top performers from the rest of the investment advisor population is 
a handy way of drilling into trends, as the industry’s top performers generally lead the 
way.  Top advisors are already more productive than the average advisor, and are able to 
leverage that position into better performance through market cycles. 
Advisors have been rebuilding their books steadily, making gains in overall AUM 
and in their productivity.  The average advisor has seen a healthy gain in AUM to $82 
million in 2011 from $77 million in 2010; more impressive is this gain in AUM 
occurred amid a trimming of client rosters, thereby boosting productivity; overall, 
advisors are shifting their books out of smaller accounts and reporting higher 
allocations to larger accounts.20 
In its inaugural “Annual Report on the State of Retail Wealth Management”, 
PriceMetrix21 revealed several investment advisor trends: 
                                                
20 J. Langton and O. Li (2011), “Lower-end advisors lead rebound”, Investment Executive Special Feature.  
21 PriceMetrix is a software firm that helps retail wealth management firms and their advisors optimize 
selling efforts, manage clients, identify growth opportunities, and enhance practice management.  Through 
its exclusive relationships with North American retail wealth management providers, PriceMetrix directly 
measures aggregated data representing 2.3 million investors, 380 million transactions, 1 million fee-based 
accounts, 4 million transactional accounts, and over $850 billion in investment assets. 
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• Table 3.6 shows that asset and revenue levels for advisors have reached record 
highs. 
 
Table 3.6 - Advisor Performance22 
 
Source: PriceMetrix (2011), “Annual Report on the State of Retail Wealth Management” 
 
• Table 3.7 below shows that advisors are looking to increase productivity by 
focusing on fewer, but more profitable (more AUM) households. 
 
Table 3.7 - Household Quality23 
 
Source: PriceMetrix (2011), “Annual Report on the State of Retail Wealth Management” 
 
• Advisors are increasing the number of fee-based accounts to increase and 
stabilize revenue (see Table 3.8). 
                                                
22 Reproduced with the permission of PriceMetrix.  Any and all conclusions drawn from this table for the 
purpose of this paper are that of the author(s) and not of PriceMetrix. 
23 Reproduced with the permission of PriceMetrix.  Any and all conclusions drawn from this table for the 
purpose of this paper are that of the author(s) and not of PriceMetrix. 
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Advisor Asset and Revenue Levels Have Hit Record Highs
Advisor asset levels and annual gross production have rebounded from the market downturn of 2008/2009 
(Table 1). Indeed, average advisor assets reached a record high of $71.5 million in 2010, though only an 8% 
increase over 2008. Average advisor 
production also posted an all-time high at 
$522,000, representing a 7% increase over 
2008 levels and an 18% increase over 
2009. Top producers saw even more 
growth – the average top producer1 
grossed $1,243,000 in 2010, up 11% from 
$1,124,000 in 2008. RoA (12 month total 
revenue/12 month average assets) appears 
to be stabilizing, holding steady at 73 basis 
points (bps) from 2009 to 2010 (and down 
only slightly from 74 bps in 2008). New business activity is showing continued strength in 2010 with 22 new 
accounts opened per advisor, up from 14 in 2008.
Advisor Performance 2008 2009 2010 Growth Since 2008
Advisor Assets ($M) $66.2 $60.5 $71.5 8%
Gross Annual 
Production ($000) $488 $444 $522 7%
Top Producers’ Production 
(top 10% of advisors, $000) $1,124 $1,034 $1,243 11%
RoA (12 month total revenue/12 
month average assets) 0.74% 0.73% 0.73% -1%
New Accounts Opened 
per Advisor 14 25 22 57%
Advisors are Focusing on Larger, More Productive Households
Overall, advisors are improving the quality of their books by stemming the influx of new small3 households. The 
result is a 4% reduction in the overall number of households per advisor from 2008 to 2010. The proportion of 
small households in the average advisor’s book has dropped from 56% in 2008 to 45% in 2010. Driven largely 
by this reduction in small households, advisors have experienced a 20% increase in average household revenue 
from 2008 to 2010 and a 6% increase in the percentage of households with more than 1 account (Table 2). 
In contrast, the subset of advisors who maintained or increased their concentration of small households 
experienced only a 4% increase in average household revenue and no change in the percentage of households 
with more than 1 account.
$444
2009
Year
$480
$500
$520
$540
$460
$420
$440
$400
$488
2008
$522
2010
Gross Annual Production
($000)
Table 1: Advisor Trends2
1 Top 10% of advisors in North America.
2 Based on PriceMetrix ValueOne aggregated database.
3 Households with less than $50,000 in assets.
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As explored in previous editions of 
Insights, these results reinforce the 
strong will and growing effectiveness 
of advisors in addressing the small 
household challenge. Clearly, advisors 
are becoming more diligent at focusing 
their businesses on households that 
are sizeable and more prod ctive.
Household Quality 2008 2009 2010 Growth Since 2008
Households per Advisor 202 201 193 -4%
Household  with Less 
tha  $50,000 in Assets 
(percentage)
56% 50% 45% -20%
Annual Household 
Revenue (average) $2,453 $2,405 $2,944 20%
Households with 
More than 1 Account 
(percentage)
51% 52% 54% 6%
Fee-Based Accounts are Growing; Pricing is Under Pressure
The significant efforts by advisors to build their fee-based business are reflected in the growth of fee-based 
accounts from 2008 to 2010 (Table 3). The average number of fee-based accounts per advisor has grown by 
43% over the three years, and now sits at 76. Fee-based assets, as a percentage of total assets, have also risen 
from 19% to 24% over the past two years. While this is encouraging, the 15% decrease in fee-based accounts 
priced above 1% is not. Nor is the overall drop in fee RoA from 1.41% of assets in 2008 to 1.32% in 2010. 
Th re is clearly downward pressure on 
fee-based product pricing, though 
some recovery has taken place from 
2009 to 2010. That said, 32% of 
advisors were able to raise their overall 
fee RoA by at least 10 bps from 2008 
to 2010. Our next edition of Insights 
will explore fee-based asset pricing 
in detail.
Annual Household Revenue
(Average)
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Ta le 2: usehold Trends2
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2Based on PriceMetrix ValueOne aggregated database.
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Table 3.8 - Fee Business24 
 
Source: PriceMetrix (2011), “Annual Report on the State of Retail Wealth Management” 
 
• Transactional business is recovering after the 2008 capital bear market (see 
Table 3.9). 
 
Table 3.9 - Transactional Business25 
 
Source: PriceMetrix (2011), “Annual Report on the State of Retail Wealth Management” 
 
                                                
24 Reproduced with the permission of PriceMetrix.  Any and all conclusions drawn from this table for the 
purpose of this paper are that of the author(s) and not of PriceMetrix. 
25 Reproduced with the permission of PriceMetrix.  Any and all conclusions drawn from this table for the 
purpose of this paper are that of the author(s) and not of PriceMetrix. 
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Fee Business4 2008 2009 2010 Growth Since 2008
Fee Accounts per Advisor 53 61 76 43%
Average Fee 
Account Size ($000) $289 $249 $255 -12%
Fee Assets as a 
Percentage of All Assets 19% 20% 24% 26%
Fee Accounts 
Priced Above 1% 71% 62% 60% -15%
Fee RoA 1.41% 1.31% 1.32% -6%
Transactional Business Has Experienced a Solid Recovery From 2008
The significant growth in fee-based business does not appear to have been at the expense of transactional 
business (Table 4). Transactional volume has returned to pre-downturn levels with average annual equity trades 
per advisor at 457, surpassing 2008 levels and up 13% over 2009. Contrary to popular belief, trading investors 
did not flee the market ‘en masse’ after the financial crisis. Annual trades per household declined by only 3% in 
2009, and remained unchanged in 2010, with buys surpassing sells through the entire period.
A 9% decline in the average equity trade principal may be partially explained by a decline in share prices. The 
average ticket, however, has increased from $224 to $231, resulting in significantly improved price levels – a 
positive sign for the industry. While the proportion of trades executed at full ‘list price’ continues to decline 
(perhaps more a reflection of a continued 
loss of confidence in the structure of 
firms’ price schedules), the proportion of 
trades priced below $100 has remained 
constant. Perhaps the greatest overall 
measure of pricing health for the industry 
is that 32% of advisors raised their equity 
transactional price levels by at least 10% 
from 2008 to 2010.
le 3: e-Based Business Trends2
Equity Trade Pricing
(Commission as percentage of trade principal)
1.02%
2008
1.15%
2010
1.08%
2009
Year
1.15%
1.20%
1.10%
1.00%
1.05%
0.95%
2 Based on PriceMetrix ValueOne aggregated database.
4 For this analysis we define the scope of fee-based accounts to include separately managed accounts and advisory accounts 
(both with and without advisor discretion). Third party management fees are not included as part of RoA, though non-fee 
revenue in fee accounts (e.g. new issues) is.
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Transactional Business 2008 2009 2010 Growth Since 2008
Equity Trades per Advisor 446 417 457 2%
Equity Trades per Household 3.1 3.0 3.0 -3%
Buys 51.2% 52.9% 52.2% 2%
Average Equity 
Trade Principal $21,932 $20,744 $20,060 -9%
Equity Trade Pricing 
(commissions as a 
percentage of principal)
1.02% 1.08% 1.15% 13%
Average Equity Ticket $224 $224 $231 3%
Percentage of Equity Trade 
Commissions Priced at Full 
Firm Schedule (‘list price’)
34.7% 34.3% 32.2% -7%
Percentage of Discounted 
Equity Trade Commissions 
Priced Below $100 
17.4% 17.5% 17.6% 1%
General Health of the Industry is Improving
The analysis in this paper indicates that the general health of the retail wealth management industry is 
improving. In many areas it has recovered from the downturn of 2008/2009 to record performances in 2010. 
Two thirds of the performance indicators we examined show improvement during this time period. Assets are 
up, production is up and transactional pricing is bett r. Advisors are growing their fee-based business, saying 
‘no’ to small ho seholds, an  building more productive household relationships.
This report n the state of retail wealth management can be used to benchmark your performance against the 
industry or to build future business objectives within the context of what a typical advisor has achieved. For 
information about custom benchmarking of your business, or to provide your feedback on this special issue of 
Insights, or to offer suggestions for future topics, please contact Doug Trott, President and CEO of PriceMetrix, 
at 416-955-4498 or Doug.Trott@pricemetrix.com.
le 4: Retail Transactional Trends2
2Based on PriceMetrix ValueOne aggregated database.
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What’s interesting is that it appears the channel’s high fliers are having a harder 
time than run-of-the mill producers in recovering lost ground.  Among the top 20% of 
advisors, average AUM is down to roughly $149 million from $157 million; in contrast, 
the remaining 80% of brokers recorded a strong gain in average AUM, pushing their total 
by a healthy 12.5%, to roughly $64 million from $56 million.26 
The drop in AUM and the resulting decline in productivity for the top 20% is 
largely a result of a reduction in the largest accounts – those worth more than $2 million.  
In contrast, the remaining 80% have seen accounts in the $250,000 to $1 million range 
grow to almost 51% of this broker segment’s book, up from 45%; these advisors are also 
enjoying growth in the $1 million plus accounts, including those worth more than $2 
million, up to roughly 19% from 16%.  Not only are the remaining 80% of advisors 
driving the increase in overall channel AUM and productivity, they are also leading a 
trend toward a greater reliance on insurance revenue throughout the channel. 
The full-service broker channel can also be segmented based on revenue driver 
and region: 
Revenue driver – There are different ways in which an advisor can generate 
revenue; some advisors focus on commission-generating buy/sell transactions; others 
focus on charging a flat fee or a percentage fee on AUM.  The list of revenue drivers 
includes:  
• Commissions 
• Fees 
• Spread 
• Other 
 
Fee-based revenue streams are growing at the fastest rate - over 30% year-
over-year growth to March 2010 vs. under 20% for commission revenue, and roughly 
25% for all revenues in total; but fee-based revenue can be further segmented as follows: 
• Mutual Funds 
                                                
26 J. Lanton and O. Li (2011), “Lower-end advisors lead rebound”, Investment Executive Special Feature. 
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• Managed Assets: 
o Fund Wraps 
o Fee-Based Brokerage 
o Discretionary Assets 
o Separately Managed Wraps 
o In-House Managed Wraps 
o Advisor Managed 
 
Within the fee-based segment, managed assets continue their upward trend and 
now constitute over 25% of all assets.  The top drivers of growth in fee-based assets are 
Advisor Managed (AM), with over 40% year-over-year growth to the end of March 2010, 
and fee-based brokerage at just under 40% growth.27 
The growth of fee-based assets, and in particular AM programs at rates well 
above the overall average asset growth rate of just under 25%, indicates a continued 
preference for these flexible and more productive non-discretionary and discretionary 
programs. 
Region – Table 3.10 looks at the regional distribution of assets and advisors.  
Assets grew in all regions, particularly in Ontario, which claimed a bigger share of the 
overall pie at the expense of regions such as Quebec.  At the same time, the majority of 
regions experienced a decrease in advisors year-over-year, with the exception of Ontario 
and Manitoba and Saskatchewan.  Overall, assets grew at faster rate than advisors across 
all regions, resulting in average AUM per advisor of over $70 million. 
 
  
                                                
27 Investor Economics (2010), “The Retail Brokerage Report – Spring 2010” 
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Table 3.10 - Full-Service Brokerage Assets and Advisors by Region (March 2010)28 
 
Source: Investor Economics (2010), “The Retail Brokerage Report – Spring 2010” 
 
3.6.1 Summary of Supplier Opportunities and Threats 
 
It is important to highlight that advisors represent a very important, if not the most 
important, part of the value chain.  HNW investors want to work with an advisor; and to 
be more productive, advisors are increasingly targeting HNW investors, are focusing on 
generating fee-based revenue, and are more willing to change firms in order to do so.  
The following table summarizes advisor related opportunities and threats. 
 
  
                                                
28 Reproduced with the permission of Investor Economics.  Any and all conclusions drawn from this table 
for the purpose of this paper are that of the author(s) and not of Investor Economics. 
The Retail Brokerage Report - Spring 2010
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Regional Coverage
 Figures 3.15 and 3.16 look at the regional distribution of assets and advisors. As assets increased, Ontario 
claimed a bigger piece of the pie, increasing its share from 41.7% in Q4 2009 to 42.3% in Q1 2010 thanks 
to the above-national average 4.3% asset growth. This increase in share came at the expense of the share 
of Quebec and Alberta as the asset growth for those regions fell below the overall average. All other regions 
grew at about 3.1% in the first quarter of the year and maintained their asset share. Curiously, the decline in 
Mar 2010 3-mo Yr/yr
3.16 Full-service Brokerage Assets and Advisors by Region
 Assets in billions of dollars
Dec 2009Mar 2009
Assets
Mar 2010Dec 2009Mar 2009
Number of advisors*
Canada $573  $694  $715  3.1% 24.8%
 Atlantic 21 27 28 3.1% 28.8%
 Quebec 114 136 138 1.1% 21.0%
 Ontario 242 290 302 4.3% 24.6%
 Manitoba and Saskatchewan 27 33 34 3.2% 24.3%
 Alberta 74 93 95 2.2% 28.8%
 B.C. and Territories 94 115 119 2.9% 26.2%
Canada  10,430   10,237   10,305  0.7% -1.2%
 Atlantic  500   466   473  1.5% -5.4%
 Quebec  2,007   1,805   1,816  0.6% -9.5%
 Ontario  4,130   4,231   4,266  0.8% 3.3%
 Manitoba and Saskatchewan  517   527   537  1.9% 3.8%
 Alberta  1,286   1,243   1,264  1.7% -1.7%
 B.C. and Territories  1,990   1,965   1,949  -0.8% -2.0%
*Industry number of advisors is estimated based on survey respondents plus a gross-up factor. 
3-mo Yr/yr
Growth
Growth
3.15 Full-service Brokerage Assets and Advisors by Region—March 2010
FULL-SERVICE BROKERS
13.3%
Alberta
3.9%
Atlantic
16.6%
B.C. and
Territories
4.7%
Manitoba and
Saskatchewan
42.3%
Ontario
19.2%
Quebec 12.3%
Alberta
4.6%
Atlantic
18.9%
B.C. and
Territories
5.2%
Manitoba and
Saskatchewan
41.4%
Ontario
17.6%
Quebec
3.15 Full-service Brokerage Assets and Advisors by Region-March 2010
Assets Advisors
Spring 2007The Retail Brokerage ReportPage 9 of 23
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Table 3.11 - Summary of Supplier Opportunities and Threats 
Opportunities Threats 
• Advisors are becoming more 
productive by targeting HNW investors 
and focusing on generating fee-based 
revenue.  HNW investors have more 
complex needs.  Firms that can best 
support advisors in becoming more 
productive will attract more/better 
advisors. 
• Firms with a national footprint allow 
advisors to be where the HNW 
investors are. 
• The customer market is growing at a 
faster pace than the advisor market. 
• The top 20% of advisors are having a 
tougher time with growth, perhaps 
because there is less opportunity to 
increase productivity, and perhaps 
because the HNW investor is more on 
the move (including wealth transfer). 
• Firms are looking to attract advisors 
and many advisors are making the 
switch to a new firm. 
 
3.7 Five Forces Synthesis 
 
The most recent down cycle, in concert with growing regulation, has 
simultaneously put pressure on the three key elements of the economic equation: 
revenues, cost, and operational risk management.  To combat economic pressures and 
chart a path to expansion, healthy firms are making larger bets on the future, committing 
resources and capital to ensure success.  Other firms are envisioning a different future in 
which the channel’s business models will multiply and diverge from the current prevalent 
linkage of planning and sales, as well as the existing advisor compensation paradigms.  
For example, the trend towards offering the Independent Agent model by the independent 
broker-dealer firms vs. the Employee model.   
There are those in the industry who believe a secular shift away from direct-drive 
high pay-out compensation, to a salary/bonus structure is inevitable.  The drivers include 
all the previously mentioned pressures: economic, regulatory, operational risk, and the 
aging of the existing sales force.  There is a growing belief that the next generation of 
advisors would be more suited to the salary/bonus structure, trading off the upside reward 
of a direct-drive model for the stability and life-balancing of a salary/bonus model. 
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The following analysis will examine the five competitive forces29 that influence 
both the current profitability of the full-service broker-dealer industry, and perhaps more 
importantly, by analysing all five competitive forces, a more complete picture of what 
influences industry profitability will identify “game-changing” trends early so that BNS 
can exploit them, or reshape the forces in its favour. 
 
3.7.1 Rivalry 
 
Despite roughly 200 firms and 10,000 investment advisors nationally, rivalry 
within the full-service brokerage channel is moderate.  What factors influence the 
intensity of rivalry? 
First, while the number of competitors is numerous, as previously mentioned, the 
‘Big Six’ bank owned full-service brokerage firms control over 70% of AUM, while the 
top ten firms overall control over 85% of AUM.  Second, the market for affluent and 
HNW customers is growing at a faster rate than the number of advisors.  Third, exit 
barriers are low; however, there may be high commitment to maintaining a full-service 
brokerage subsidiary, particularly by the ‘Big Six’ in order to offer a full line of products 
and services, or support other subsidiaries/divisions (e.g. investment banking).  Finally, 
firms are able to read each other’s signals well, as industry players are very familiar with 
one another, and information is shared with/by mutually affiliated third party 
organizations (e.g. mutual funds companies, PriceMetrix, Investor Economics). 
The strength of rivalry is also dependent on the basis of competition, which is 
increasingly on other dimensions (e.g. service, brand) and less on price; in fact, the most 
recent trend in pricing is upwards, as full-service brokers strengthen relationships and 
bundle more services and products to meet the increasing demands of investors.  Price 
competition is limited as products/services are increasingly more complex and 
perceived to be highly differentiated; switching costs are high as it takes time to 
research products, services, advisors, firms, and develop new relationships; and the 
                                                
29 Michael E. Porter (2008), “The Five Competitive Forces That Shape Strategy”, Harvard Business Review 
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industry has low operating leverage (advisors are the largest cost – variable cost). 
Lastly, the different competitor segments discussed in Section 3.4 to a large degree 
target different customer segments (see Section 3.5).  This may increase industry 
profitability as the needs of different customer segments are better met.  Table 3.12 
maps out the important factors which drive rivalry among competitors. 
 
Table 3.12 - Competitor Rivalry30 
Rivalry  
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# Of Equals Large    è  Small 
Industry Growth Slow     X Fast 
Operating Leverage High    X  Low 
Differentiation Low   X   High 
Capacity Increases Large  è    Small 
Competitor Diversity High   è   Low 
Strategic Stakes High X     Low 
 
3.7.2 Threat of Entry 
 
The threat of entry into the full-service broker industry is moderate.  Barriers to 
entry include: 
• Supply-side economies of scale/scope - Rising costs argue for a solution in the 
form of larger scale, some form of integration, or both.  The ‘Big Six’ are 
                                                
30 D. Dunne and D. Beatty (2011), “The Top Manager’s Top Ten”, Rotman School Of Management, 
University of Toronto 
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leading the way, as they are able to offer the full suite of brokerage and 
banking products and services, plus they are able to benefit from cross-
referrals of customers between different business lines.  Technology has 
become a critical element of success, and smaller firms often cannot afford 
access to the efficiencies technology can provide.  For mid-sized broker-
dealer firms, building scale has become increasingly difficult, and 
consolidation offers limited opportunity, as the prevailing view is that there 
are few attractive acquisition opportunities left. 
• Demand-side benefits of scale/scope – Both customers and advisors derive 
peace-of-mind from “too big to fail” and a recognized brand name; again, the 
bank owned firms are the leaders. 
• Customer switching costs – While direct fixed costs are low, it takes time to 
research a new product, service, firm, advisor, and develop a new relationship.  
As previously mentioned, the bank owned firms are not only able to offer the 
full suite of brokerage and planning services, but also deposits, lending, 
foreign exchange, etc.  Often it’s all-or-nothing when it comes to customers’ 
holistic financial affairs, meaning if they move, they have to move everything 
• Capital Requirements – Operational leverage is low and capital requirements 
for fixed costs such as premises and technology can be overcome with 
minimal scale. 
• Incumbency Advantages – The biggest sources of incumbency advantage 
independent of size are brand, proprietary technology (resulting in better and 
more consistent performance) and experienced advisors. 
• Access to Distribution Channels – Advisors are the primary distribution 
channels for the full-service brokerage industry, and attracting advisors is 
largely dependent on being able to overcome many of the other barriers to 
entry. 
• Government policy – Regulatory changes require investments in technology, 
staffing and training; and specific licensing is required in order to offer certain 
products/services and operate in different regions. 
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The biggest threat of new entry comes from the financial advisor channel (mutual 
fund dealers), which is regulated by the MFDA, and the insurance industry, also partly 
regulated by the MFDA, crossing over into the full-service brokerage channel (e.g. 
Manulife Securities).  Their value proposition has historically been anchored around 
financial planning and mutual funds.  Several of these firms have added the IIROC 
platform to accommodate individual advisors’ business objectives of being able to 
offer a full range of products and services.   
The financial advisor channel is large in terms of the number of firms, advisors, 
and AUM.  Over time, the cadre of competitors with financial advisor firms has expanded 
to include companies outside the channel such as branch advice arms of the banks, and 
some full-service brokerage firms.  The following figure illustrates assets by advice 
distribution channel and share of financial wealth.  The full-service channel controls the 
largest share of AUM. 
 
Figure 3.6 - Assets by Advice Distribution Channel and Share of Financial Wealth (December 2009)31 
 
Source: Investor Economics (2010), “The Retail Brokerage Report – Spring 2010” 
 
                                                
31 Reproduced with the permission of Investor Economics.  Any and all conclusions drawn from this figure 
for the purpose of this paper are that of the author(s) and not of Investor Economics. 
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Section 1 – Lead Story
1.2 The Financial Advisor Channel, continued  
Assante Financial Management
Global Maxfin Investments
Investors Group Financial Services
IPC Investments
Manulife Securities Investment Services
PEAK Investment Services
Portfolio Strategies Corporation
Queensbury Strategies
Worldsource Financial Management
Assante Capital Management
Global Maxfin Capital
Investors Group Securities
IPC Securities
Manulife Securities Incorporated
PEAK Securities
Portfolio Strategies Securities
Queensbury Securities
Worldsource Securities
Dual-platform Financial Advisor Firms
FA-MFDA FA-IIROC
Desjardins Financial Security Investments
Dundee Private Investors
FundEX Investments
Investia Financial Services
MGI Financial
Qtrade Asset Management
Wellington West Financial Services
Desjardins Securities
Dundee Securities
Industrial Alliance Securities
Industrial Alliance Securities
MGI Securities
Qtrade Advisor
Wellington West Capital
Single-platform Financial Advisor Firms with Affiliated Full-service Brokerage Firms
FA-MFDA FA-IIROC
1.3  Assets by Advice Distribution Channel and Share of Financial Wealth—December 2009  
 In billions of dollars1.3 Assets by Advice Distribution Channel and Share of Financial Wealth͸December 2009
In billions of dollars
$275.3
$25.3
$244.2
$694.0
$188.1
Branch advice MGAs Financial advisors
(MFDA & IIROC)
Full-service
brokerage
PIC & E&T
10.2% 9.0%
25.6%
6.9%
Share of financial 
wealth
0.9%
Total financial wealth: $2,706 B
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Figure 3.7 indicates indexed asset growth for the full-service brokerage and 
financial advisor channels.  The full-service channel appears to be more sensitive to 
economic cycles. 
 
Figure 3.7 - Indexed Asset Growth for Full-Service Brokerage and Financial Advisor Channels32 
 
Source: Investor Economics (2010), “The Retail Brokerage Report – Spring 2010” 
 
All of these channels/firms, including large international financial institutions, 
pose a threat as they are able to overcome many, if not all, of the entry barriers with 
strong distribution networks, access to capital, strong brand names, loyal customers, and 
economies of scale/scope.  Table 3.13 highlights the factors that affect the threat of entry. 
 
  
                                                
32 Reproduced with the permission of Investor Economics.  Any and all conclusions drawn from this figure 
for the purpose of this paper are that of the author(s) and not of Investor Economics. 
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Figure 1.4 tracks the financial advisor channel’s book of business. The channel is large: it administers close to a 
quarter-trillion dollars. Assets are on the rebound but remain below pre-2008 levels.
Figure 1.5 highlights not only the softer landing but also the slower pace of recovery in the channel’s asset base 
compared to the full-service brokerage channel. This reflects the traditionally more balanced portfolio of the 
financial advisor channel.
1.4 Assets under Administration in the Financial Advisor Channel 
 In billions of dollars1.4 Assets under Administration in the Financial Advisor Channel
In billions of dollars
227.6 224.4 224.9
209.4
187.6 184.2 193.8
203.2 211.4
215.4
36.4 35.7 40.0
38.1
30.5 30.0
29.2
31.9
32.8 34.1
Dec 2007 Mar 2008 Jun 2008 Sep 2008 Dec 2008 Mar 2009 Jun 2009 Sep 2009 Dec 2009 Mar 2010
MFDA assets
IIROC assets
$249.4
$244.2
$236.1
$223.7
$214.2$218.1
$247.5
$264.9$260.1$264.0
86.3% 86.0% 86.4%
MFDA share of total 
FA channel assets
1.5 Indexed Asset Growth for Full-service Brokerage and Financial Advisor Channels 
 Assets under administration at September 2007 = 100
1.5 Indexed Asset Growth for Full-service Brokerage and Financial Advisor Channels
Assets under administration at September 2007 = 100
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105
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Full-service brokerage
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Table 3.13 - Threat of Entry33 
Threat of Entry  
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Economies of Scale Small     X Large 
Differentiation Little   X   Big 
Brand Low     X High 
Switching Cost Low    X  High 
Access to 
Distribution Ample   X   Rest 
Capital 
Requirements Low    ç  High 
Access to Technology Ample    ç  Rest 
Access to Materials Ample   ç   Rest 
Experience Effect Un-NB    è  
Very-
NB 
 
3.7.3 Power of Suppliers 
 
Human capital (i.e. advisors) and technology (e.g. CRM, analytics, integration) 
are the major suppliers to the full-service brokerage channel.  Most of the value chain 
(research, underwriting, marketing, sales, trading, and back office, compliance) has been 
vertically/horizontally integrated, particularly among the ‘Big Six’ banks. 
The power of technology providers is moderate-to-high.  Full-service brokerage 
firms are increasingly dependent on technology to reduce costs, save time, and squeeze 
every ounce of value from their information assets, as it pertains to advisor productivity 
(e.g. client relationship management, analytics, operating system, desktop).  The number 
                                                
33 D. Dunne and D. Beatty (2011), “The Top Manager’s Top Ten”, Rotman School of Management, 
University of Toronto 
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of ‘brand name’ firms that can provide integrated technology platforms is consolidating 
(i.e. technology providers are more concentrated than the full-service brokerage 
industry), and they are able to diversify their revenue sources by adapting and supplying 
their products and services to many other industries.  These same products and services 
are differentiated, and once in place, are highly integrated into processes, and across 
systems; as a result, the cost to switch is high (including significant retraining), and at 
present, there is no feasible substitute.  Technology suppliers also pose a credible threat 
to integrating forward into the full-service brokerage industry (see Section 3.7.5), 
although this can work both ways. 
The power of advisors has historically been low given the large number and 
fragmentation of advisors; however, this power is growing as full-service brokerage firms 
look to grow their share of the HNW customer market.  It’s cheaper to lure experienced 
advisors (the top 20% segment) and the high growth advisors, than to acquire whole 
firms, or train new advisors that can provide the level of service that HNW 
customers demand.34  The number of experienced and high growth advisors is more 
concentrated, and they can redeploy their skills (i.e. sales, relationship management, 
negotiations, specific industry knowledge) to other industries.35  What does it take to 
attract the right advisors? 
In its most recent annual “Brokerage Report Card”, Investment Executive asked 
629 advisors across fourteen retail brokerages what is most important to them – of the 36 
categories measured, freedom to make objective service/product choices, firm ethics, and 
firm stability, were ranked highest in importance “year after year”, regardless of the 
prevailing economic conditions.  Full-service brokerage firms that performed the best 
across the categories listed in Table 3.12 below were the firms whose advisors were the 
most satisfied. 
 
                                                
34 Advisors can be incented to move for a lower earnings multiple vs. acquiring a firm. 
35 It is less feasible for advisors to forward integrate with any scale as industry regulation prohibits any 
collusion. 
 35 
Table 3.14 – 2011 Brokerage Report Card - What Matters to Advisors36 
 
 
The following tables highlight important factors, which influence the power of 
advisors and technology providers, respectively. 
 
Table 3.15 - Advisor Power37 
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# Of Advisors Few     ç Many 
Substitutes Low  è    High 
Switching Costs High   ç   Low 
Forward Integration High    X  Low 
Backward 
Integration Low X     High 
                                                
36 Reproduced with the permission of Investment Executive.  Any and all conclusions drawn from this table 
for the purpose of this paper are that of the author(s) and not of Investment Executive. 
37 D. Dunne and D. Beatty (2011), “The Top Manager’s Top Ten”, Rotman School of Management, 
University of Toronto 
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Quality Contribution High  ç    Low 
Advisors’ Cost Large Bit X     
Small 
Bit 
Advisors’ 
Profitability Small    X  Large 
 
Table 3.16 - Power of Technology Providers 
3.7.3.1.1.1.1 Technol
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# Of Providers Few  X    Many 
Substitutes Low X     High 
Switching Costs High  ç    Low 
Forward Integration High    ç  Low 
Backward 
Integration Low X     High 
Quality Contribution High  ç    Low 
Providers’ Cost Large Bit X  X   
Small 
Bit 
Providers’ 
Profitability Small   ç   Large 
 
 
  
 37 
3.7.4 Power of Buyers 
 
The power of individual retail customers is low, but may be on the rise, 
particularly within the HNW customer segment, as competition for their business likely 
intensifies; however, while products and services are standardized, they are increasingly 
more complex to understand, and perceived to be highly differentiated.  Switching costs 
are high in terms of time and effort to do the due diligence on new products, services, 
advisors, firms, and developing new relationships.  While the HNW customer market is 
the fastest growing customer segment and demands/purchases products and services in 
larger volumes; it is still highly fragmented, and there are fewer advisors that have the 
expertise to deliver all they want/need.  While it may not be feasible for customers to 
backward integrate, there are customer segments, such as retirees, who may have the time 
to do their own research and switch to a substitute for execution (see Section 3.7.5). 
In terms of buyer price sensitivity, brokerage commissions/fees are a relatively 
small percentage of AUM and in many cases there is lack of transparency.  Economic and 
market cycles can influence price sensitivity – buyers are more sensitive during 
recessions and bear markets.  Great planning and investment performance (or lack 
thereof) can significantly impact investors’ current and future quality of life.  Ultimately, 
customers are price insensitive when it comes to the quality of their current and 
future lifestyle. 
Of note (and mentioned at the start of Section 3.6), advisors could be considered 
(intermediate) buyers of full-service brokerage products/services.  Highly experienced 
and knowledgeable advisors can influence end buyer purchase decisions, and so would 
have greater buyer (supplier) power.  Advisors who possess certain credentials and 
affiliated association membership could market directly to end buyers through their 
associations, which promote the benefit of dealing with advisors who have earned their 
awarded designation (e.g. Chartered Financial Analyst, Chartered Accountant, Certified 
Financial Planner).  Table 3.16 highlights the factors that influence the power of buyers. 
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Table 3.17 - Buyer Power38 
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# Of Buyers Few     X Many 
Substitutes Many    ç  Few 
Switching Costs Low    X  High 
Backward 
Integration High    ç  Low 
Forward Integration Low X     High 
Quality Contribution Small     X Large 
Buyers’ Cost Large Bit    ç  
Small 
Bit 
Buyers’ Profitability Low    X  High 
 
3.7.5 Threat of Substitutes 
 
The threat of substitutes is moderate-to-high.  The biggest threat is from discount 
brokers and other specialized providers, who together have captured a significant slice of 
the retail market with generally lower prices and more enterprising use of technology.  In 
particular, these new entrants have capitalized on the growth of direct channels (i.e. 
internet). 
 
  
                                                
38 D. Dunne and D. Beatty (2011), “The Top Manager’s Top Ten”, Rotman School of Management, 
University of Toronto 
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Table 3.18 - Online/Discount Brokerage Asset Ranking39 
 
Source: Investor Economics (2010), “The Retail Brokerage Report – Spring 2010” 
 
These firms unbundle the offerings of the full-service providers and concentrate 
on specific sources of value to investors, addressing targeted customer needs, and 
fostering the perception that their services are cheaper (see Figure 3.8).  They have 
developed direct channels to circumvent the physical footprint advantage of the 
incumbents at a time when consumer adoption of electronic and other forms of direct 
access is increasingly replacing the need for face-to-face dealings. 
 
  
                                                
39 Reproduced with the permission of Investor Economics.  Any and all conclusions drawn from this table 
for the purpose of this paper are that of the author(s) and not of Investor Economics. 
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 The dominance of the Big Six bank-owned firms was unchanged as the market share of the top five firms held 
constant at 86.4% (see Figure 4.3). Questrade and Credential Direct were ranked one-two in terms of growth 
rate for the second consecutive quarter, while BMO InvestorLine, in third position, was the top-ranked bank 
competitor. Of the fastest-growing firms by assets this quarter, three of the top five were non-bank-owned 
brokerages.
Online/discount brokers $213 $202 5.8% $11.7 
 TD Waterhouse Discount Brokerage 1 1 8 1
 RBC Direct Investing 2 2 7 2
 BMO InvestorLine 3 3 3 3
 ScotiaMcLeod Direct Investing* 4 4 9 4
 CIBC Investor’s Edge 5 5 6 5
 Top 5 $184 $174 5.8% $10.1 
      Market share 86.4% 86.4%  
 National Bank Direct Brokerage 6 6 10 7
 HSBC InvestDirect 7 7 4 6
 Disnat 8 8 5 8
 Questrade 9 9 1 9
 Credential Direct 10 10 2 10
 JitneyTrade 11 11 11 11
*As of December 2008, includes Scotia iTRADE.
Asset rank
4.3 Online/Discount Brokerage Asset Ranking
 Ranked by assets in billions of dollars, three-month growth rates and asset change
Dec 2009Mar 2010
3-mo 
growth rate
3-mo
asset change
Growth rank
 40 
Figure 3.8 - Unbundling the Sources of Value to the Customer 
 
Source:  Booz-Allen & Hamilton 
 
By unbundling full-service brokerage services, specialized providers have been 
able to appeal to specific investor groups, particularly the self-directed investors.  In 
using these specialized providers, customers can reduce their overall cost of investing by 
accessing only the services they need (e.g. transaction execution).  To obtain investment 
selection advice, self-directed investors pay directly for financial research material.  
While such advice is available at no additional charge as part of a full-service firms 
bundle of services, the price differential for transaction execution makes the specialized 
provider a much more cost-efficient choice. 
Investors who are less self-directed and more concerned with developing and 
executing an in-depth financial plan are more likely to realize value from a full-service 
provider.  The costs of preparing a financial plan and obtaining asset allocation and 
investment selection advice on an unbundled basis quickly levels the playing field 
between specialized and full-service providers if the customer invests largely in ‘load’ 
mutual funds; however, if that planning based investor is oriented toward the purchase of 
individual securities (stocks, bonds, etc.) or ‘no-load’ mutual funds, the cost gap between 
specialized and full-service providers reappears.40 
                                                
40 N. Nandra, P. Davis, and M. Kumar (1997), “Shifting Competition in the Brokerage Industry: New 
Imperatives for Full-Service Firms”, Strategy + Business, Issue 6 
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As Figure 3.9 shows, perhaps a more significant threat is the increasing ability of 
specialized providers to integrate their offerings, thereby enhancing their appeal to full-
service customers.  For example, providers of financial software could expand their 
capabilities to include portfolio planning and execution services, thereby combining 
profiling and asset-allocation capabilities with discounted transaction execution.  
Alliances among specialized providers could further blur competitive distinctions. 
 
Figure 3.9 - Potential Threat to Full-Service Firms from Specialized Providers 
 
Source: S.I.A. Fact Book and Booz-Allen & Hamilton 
 
Table 3.18 summarizes the availability of substitutes. 
 
Table 3.19 - Threat of Substitutes41 
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Close Substitutes Large  ç    Small 
                                                
41 D. Dunne and D. Beatty (2011), “The Top Manager’s Top Ten”, Rotman School of Management, 
University of Toronto 
Planning	  and	  Asset	  Allocation	  • Discount	  brokers	  can	  align	  with	  Iinancial	  planners	  to	  provide	  full	  services	  
Investment	  Selection	  • On-­‐line	  brokerages	  can	  align	  with	  research	  providers	  • Discount	  brokers	  can	  align	  with	  research	  providers	  to	  provide	  full	  service	  
Execution	  
• Software	  Iirms	  can	  diversify	  into	  execution	  services	  
Relationship	  Management	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Switching Costs Low    X  High 
Aggressiveness High X     Low 
Price/Value High  ç    Low 
 
3.7.6 Five Forces Analysis – Industry Attractiveness and Summary of Threats and 
Opportunities 
 
The full-service broker-dealer industry has historically been very attractive with 
relatively low-to-moderate rivalry between competitors, high barriers to entry, low-to-
moderate supplier power, low buyer power, and low-to-moderate threat of substitutes.  
Sourcing information from Standard and Poor’s and Compustat, Michael Porter in his 
article “The Five Competitive Forces That Shape Strategy” demonstrated that the 
securities brokers and dealers industry (in the United States) was the most profitable in 
terms of average return on invested capital (ROIC) from 1992 to 2006.  During that time 
period, average industry ROIC was 14.9% vs. 40.9% for the security brokers and dealers 
industry.  In recent years however, trends favouring the power of buyers/suppliers and the 
increasing threat of new entry and substitutes, is putting downward pressure on industry 
profitability. 
The strengths of the full-service brokerage channel include its service and product 
breadth, personalized service, and ‘one-stop-shopping’ convenience.  As for its 
weaknesses, the channel will need to manage costs and operational efficiency. 
Government regulation, advisors, and clients are pushing the cost envelope 
higher.  The growing need for functionality and efficiency in servicing the increasing 
sophistication and demands of HNW clients, and supporting/attracting advisors in that 
task, is driving investment in technology and infrastructure on a scale reserved for only 
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the largest and most vertically/horizontally-integrated firms.  Besides advisor 
compensation, compliance, technology, and operational risk management are the most 
significant costs.   
The biggest threat to the full-service broker channel is from substitutes, such as 
discount brokers, that unbundle and target specific parts of the customer value chain with 
greater efficiency and at a lower cost (if lower quality).  The volumes in the 
online/discount broker channel remain high by historical comparison and there is no 
retraction from the strong growth momentum since 2008.  Investors are increasingly 
optimizing their channel usage, or ‘multi-channelling’, rather than devoting the entirety 
of their investment relationship to one advisor/channel. 
The biggest opportunity for the full-service brokerage channel is that the HNW 
customer segment is the fastest growing customer segment and they want the peace-of-
mind and convenience of working with an advisor who can deliver a bundle of 
services/products; more importantly, they may be willing to pay for that peace-of-mind 
and convenience.  Full-service firms must proactively promote their strengths and 
manage client relationships to ensure that the value of their complete range of capabilities 
is being utilized and appreciated.  HNW customers and advisors are on the move to firms 
that can best deliver those strengths with complete objectivity, full transparency, a 
competitive advantage, defined processes and brilliant service; so, how do competitor 
firms stack up? 
 
3.8 Sources of Advantage and Competitive Analysis 
 
The goal of this section is to determine if some firms have features that give them 
a competitive advantage.  These features can be grouped into cost advantages and 
customer utility advantages. 
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3.8.1 Cost Advantages 
 
The biggest cost to the full-service brokerage channel is advisors.  This can 
range from 50% of gross revenues for the ‘Big Six’ bank owned firms (i.e. RBC 
Dominion Securities, CIBC Wood Gundy, BMO Nesbitt Burns, ScotiaMcLeod, TD 
Waterhouse Private Investment Advice, and National Bank Financial) to 80-85% for 
some of the Boutique firms and Independent Agent model firms (e.g. Raymond James, 
Canaccord Financial, and Dundee Securities).  Other operational costs are estimated to be 
roughly 10-20% of gross revenue. 
The smaller Boutique and Independent firms may run a leaner and more efficient 
operation, but the ‘Big Six’ bank owned firms might have a cost advantage in lower pay-
outs to their advisors, even though they provide more operational support.42  They have 
also vertically/horizontally integrated and achieved significant economies of scale/scope 
and bargaining power. 
 
3.8.2 Customer Utility Advantages 
 
J.D. Power and Associates’ “Canadian Full-Service Investor Satisfaction Study”43 
which provides benchmarks for investor satisfaction that allow firms to evaluate how 
they compare to other firms, measures seven factors: investment advisor, account 
offerings, investment performance, account information, commissions and fees, website, 
and problem resolution.44 
 
  
                                                
42 Specific P&L information could not be acquired so this cost advantage can’t be confirmed. 
43 J.D. Power and Associates is a global marketing information services company providing forecasting, 
performance improvement, social media, and customer satisfaction insights and solutions.  To see the 2011 
Canadian Full-Service Investor Satisfaction Study, go to 
http://canada.jdpower.com/ratings/finance/canadian-full--service-investor-satisfaction-study/ 
44 In remaining consistent with the customer preferences highlighted earlier in the paper, the factors: 
Investment advisor, account offerings, investment performance, account information, and problem 
resolution are representative. 
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Figure 3.10 - J.D. Power and Associates 2011 Canadian Full-Service Investor Satisfaction Study45 
 
 
As shown in Figure 3.10, Wellington West Capital ranked highest in overall 
investor satisfaction, thanks to high scores in investment advisor, investment 
performance, account information, account offerings, and commissions and fees.  
Following in the rankings were RBC Dominion Securities and Raymond James.  The 
most critical element, or source of advantage, to scoring high in all the factors is the 
investment advisor.  So what matters most to (attracting) advisors? 
                                                
45 Reproduced with the permission of J.D. Power and Associates.  Any and all conclusions drawn from this 
chart for the purpose of this paper are that of the author(s) and not of J.D. Power and Associates. 
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Securities; HSBC Securities (Canada) Inc.; Laurentian Bank Securities; 
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2011 Canadian Full Service Investor Satisfaction StudySM
Customer Satisfaction Index Ranking
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for consumers:
Charts and graphs extracted from this press release must be accompanied by a statement identifying J.D. Power and 
Associates as the publisher and the J.D. Power and Associates 2011 Canadian Full Service Investor Satisfaction StudySM
as the source. Rankings are based on numerical scores, and not necessarily on statistical significance. JDPower.com
Power Circle Ratings™ are derived from consumer ratings in J.D. Power studies. For more information on Power Circle 
Ratings, visit jdpower.com/faqs. No advertising or other promotional use can be made of the information in this release or 
J.D. Power and Associates survey results without the express prior written consent of J.D. Power and Associates. 
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As mentioned earlier in the paper, the top five criteria to advisor satisfaction 
(attracting the best advisors) are: 
• Freedom to make objective product choices 
• Firm’s ethics 
• Firm’s stability 
• Firm’ delivery on promises 
• Firm’s total compensation, quality of product offering, image with public 
(brand), and advisor relationship with compliance all ranked equally as fifth 
 
Table 3.14 also highlights a significant increase in the importance of “support for 
discretionary portfolio management”, which is consistent with advisors moving towards 
more productive discretionary fee revenue; and “firm’s consumer website”. 
  
 47 
Table 3.20 - 2011 Brokerage Report Card - How Advisors Rated Their Firms46 
 
 
Boutique firm, Richardson GMP, ranked #1 overall and received the top score in: 
“freedom to make objective choices”, “advisor relationship with compliance 
department”, “quality of firm’s product offering”, “support for discretionary portfolio 
management”, and second highest score in “firm’s consumer website”.  In general, the 
boutiques and independents ranked highest overall with advisors.  Within the ‘Big Six’ 
bank-owned firms, Royal Bank is the out front leader with a clear advantage in all five of 
the most important categories. 
                                                
46 Reproduced with the permission of Investment Executive.  Any and all conclusions drawn from this table 
for the purpose of this paper are that of the author(s) and not of Investment Executive. 
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Ultimately, sources of advantage boil down to the following lowest common 
denominators: firm size, advisors, leadership, and brand.  The boutique firms have a clear 
advantage in advisors, thanks in large part to strong leadership47.  The bank owned firms 
appear to have a cost advantage in terms of size and, arguably, advisor pay-out.  Within 
the ‘Big Six’ bank owned group, RBC Dominion securities is the clear frontrunner in 
size, advisors, leadership, and brand. 
 
3.9 Other Topics/Trends of Note   
 
In recent years, there has been further consolidation within the Canadian full-
service broker channel.  Bank owned broker-dealers are the dominant distributors of 
products and services; however, advisors will continue to be the primary method of 
distribution in an increasingly complex investment environment.  In addition to BNS 
acquiring DW, National Bank Financial in the past year has acquired Wellington West 
Capital and HSBC Securities, in order to increase its scale and geographic 
distribution/diversification; however, it’s getting harder to find value and so the trend 
may slow, as it is currently cheaper to compensate individual advisors to switch firms.  
SM is aggressively trying to attract advisors from other firms, and word on the street is 
SM is offering attractive incentives to the right advisors to move.  SM has also 
introduced a growth bonus program that pays advisors a bonus for every new household 
with investable assets exceeding a specified amount. 
With the exception of Macquarie Private Wealth, foreign firms generally seem to 
be looking towards other higher growth marketplaces outside of Canada, which might 
explain HSBC Securities exit; of note, is that HSBC Securities was ranked #1 in 2012 for 
average account size (perhaps its international brand attracted large immigrant accounts). 
There is a trend in revenue generation towards fee business, particularly 
discretionary portfolio management, including advisor-managed assets.  This is 
consistent with HNW investors wanting more institutional like objectivity, transparency, 
                                                
47 Arguably, leadership is representative of the top four advisor satisfaction criteria. 
 49 
and value; and consistent with advisors trying to become more productive.  SM is ranked 
#2 within the full-service channel in AUM in fee-based programs, and #3 in AUM in 
advisor managed programs.48  This puts them in striking distance to become number one. 
HNW clients want more planning services, and advisors want more HNW clients; 
but planning is hard to scale.  In the financial advisor channel, and to a lesser extent 
brokerage firms that offer the Independent Agent model, financial advisors and 
investment advisors tend to do the planning themselves; in the full-service broker 
channel, firms are providing salary paid ‘Teams of Experts’ that investment advisors can 
leverage for planning, so they can concentrate on investment management, which is more 
easily scalable/productive. 
Within Dundee Wealth, DWMS appears to have been a loss leader for Dynamic 
Mutual Funds.  Advisors at DWMS hold on average over 50% of their client’s money in 
Dynamic Mutual Funds.  Up until the last couple of years, DWMS appears to have been 
operating at a loss.  The culture at DWMS is very entrepreneurial, and any significant 
change to the advisor model could result in advisors leaving. 
The following figure highlights key success factors to a superior client 
experience: 
 
  
                                                
48 Investor Economics, The Retail Brokerage Report – Spring 2010 
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Figure 3.11 - Key Success Factors 
 
Source: Capgemini (2005), “The Canadian Wealth Management Market 2004/2005 Report” 
 
So how does SM/DWMS stack up to the competition? 
 
3.10 External Analysis – Summary and Conclusion 
 
Neither ScotiaMcLeod nor DWM Securities has a leadership position in the full-
service broker channel; however, while SM may not rank number one in any particular 
consumer or advisor satisfaction category, of note is that SM is moving in the right 
direction, with the most improvements across all advisor criteria, including firm’s 
delivery on promises, which could be a reflection of improving leadership; also, 
firms which offer the Independent Agent model are growing AUM and average 
account size at a faster rate than the bank owned dealers, of which DWMS is one of 
them.  The following table is a SWOT analysis for SM/DWMS: 
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  Experience	  
Advisor	  Retention	  
Product/Service	  Breadth	  and	  Performance	  
Market/Geographical	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Changing	  Business	  Model	  Revenue,	  Fees,	  and	  Cost	  Management	  
Operational	  Effectiveness	  
Technology	  
Client	  Acquisition	  and	  Growth	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Table 3.21 - External Analysis - SWOT 
Strength Weaknesses 
• Canadian financial institutions have a 
global reputation for stability. 
• BNS is Canada’s most international 
bank. 
• SM/DWMS currently offers two 
advisor models – Independent Agent 
and Independent Employee - to suit 
different individual advisor business 
models, the only bank-owned firm(s) 
to do so. 
• Leadership is moving SM in the right 
direction. 
• SM offers a ‘Team of Experts’ for 
advisors to leverage so they can focus 
on more productive/scalable activities. 
• SM offers advisors a strong fee-based 
and discretionary portfolio management 
platform. 
• Based on customer score in terms of 
commissions and fees, clients may not 
perceive they’re getting enough value. 
• SM needs to address the following: 
• Technology tools and advisor desktop; 
• Firm’s consumer advertising; 
• Client account statements; 
• Support for tax planning; 
• Firm’s succession program for 
advisors; 
• Firm’s due diligence; process for new 
products; 
• Firm’s ethics. 
Opportunities Threats 
• An improving global economy will lead 
to an increase in wealth. 
• HNW investors are the fastest growing 
investor segment, control the majority 
of investable assets, and are on the 
move. 
• HNW investors have more planning 
needs, and so present more opportunity 
for advisors to add value and be more 
productive. 
• HNW investors and the advisors who 
(can) serve them are on the move. 
• It’s cheaper to buy experienced 
advisors vs. buying firms or training 
new advisors. 
• Age 70+ HNW investors will need 
transition planning, and age 40-60-
customer segment will inherit the 
wealth. 
• SM/DWMS may be best able to replace 
HSBC Securities in serving immigrant 
investors, leveraging BNS’s “most 
international Canadian bank” brand. 
• European sovereign debt crisis could 
lead to a global economic slowdown, 
which would reduce wealth. 
• Aging advisor force could lead to a 
shortage of experienced advisors. 
• HNW investors and advisors are on the 
move. 
• Firms are stepping up efforts to attract 
advisors and HNW investors, leading to 
increased costs. 
• A third of HNW investors are age 70+. 
• The threat of online discount brokers 
and other specialized providers, which 
efficiently target certain segments of 
the customer value chain, will limit 
fees/prices that can be charged. 
• Advisor succession – There’s a lack of 
new advisors being developed. 
• Boutiques and independents are leading 
in percentage growth of AUM and 
account size. 
• All customer segments want more 
planning, which is more costly to 
deliver and harder to scale. 
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4 Strategic Alternatives 
 
After careful review of the previous sections, the original two questions posed in 
the introduction have been revised as follows: 
• Should DWMS be retained as is, merged into SM, or sold? 
• What advisor model should be adopted – Independent Agent or Employee? 
• What business strategy should be pursued – status quo or HNW scope and 
related means? 
These questions are not independent of one another, and the answer to one may 
affect the answer to another; however, the following table first highlights the important 
pros and cons of each of the strategic options independently. 
 
Table 4.1 - Pros and Cons of Strategic Options 
 Pros Cons 
DWMS   
Retain • Different strategies can be 
pursued/associated with 
each brand. 
• There are two brands to 
manage. 
• There might be 
advisor/customer confusion 
between the two brands. 
Merge • There is only one brand to 
manage. 
• Some advisors/customers, 
including those of DWMS, 
may not appreciate the SM 
brand. 
Sell • There is only one brand to 
manage. 
• Proceeds can be reinvested 
in SM. 
• Will lose a large advisor 
distribution force, and some 
advisors my reduce/eliminate 
holdings of Dynamic Mutual 
Funds. 
Advisor Model   
Employee • Ideal for advisors who are 
focused on growth/who 
don’t want to worry about 
operational issues/cost, and 
• The Employee model doesn’t 
accommodate advisors who 
want to, and are capable of 
managing operational issues. 
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 Pros Cons 
can leverage the ‘Team of 
Experts’. 
• Possible cost advantage 
with lower advisor 
payouts. 
• Profitability ratios may be 
higher. 
• The Employee model limits 
what business strategies 
advisors can pursue. 
• Operational costs are higher. 
Agent • There are advisors who 
want to, and are capable of 
managing operational 
issues. 
• Advisors have more 
freedom to choose their 
own business strategy, 
including target market, 
based on individual 
strengths/weaknesses and 
preferences. 
• Operational/marketing 
costs are lower. 
• Profitability ratios may be 
lower. 
• The Agent model may be a 
‘loss leader’ model. 
Target Client   
Status Quo 
(relative to HNW 
strategic focus) 
• Operational costs are lower 
(e.g. smaller ‘Team of 
Experts’). 
• Market scope is too broad. 
• Servicing the affluent customer 
segment is less productive. 
 
Each of these strategic options in Table 4.1 were evaluated on how well they fit 
the following criteria: 
• BNS’s framework for success 
• Attracting the right (more profitable) advisors, who have the experience, 
credentials, and skills to attract and retain more of the right clients 
• Attracting the right  (more profitable) clients 
• Improving the value proposition (for both advisors and customers)49 
• Increasing productivity and capacity 
 
                                                
49 Greater value is derived from more choices, more flexibility, and more quality services. 
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These criteria were chosen based on the corporate objectives identified in sections 
2.1 and 2.2, and the issues identified in the SWOT analysis (Table 3.15).  The criteria are 
also consistent with the key success factors identified in Figure 3.11.  Table 4.2 scores 
each option (on a scale of 1 to 5; 1 being poor and 5 indicating a good fit) based on how 
well it meets each criterion (equal weight of 20%), and then adds up each score to 
produce a final total (out of 25).  For example, for the option to retain the DWMS brand, 
the 3 representative of how well the alternative meets BNS’s framework for success.  The 
last column shows the total score for each option across all the criteria. 
 
Table 4.2 - Strategic Option and Criteria Fit 
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Retain 3 4 4 4 3 18 
Merge 4 3 3 3 3 16 
Sell 4 3 3 3 4 17 
       
Employee 4 3 3 3 4 17 
Employee 
+ Agent 
4 4 4 4 3 18 
       
Status 
Quo 
4 3 3 3 4 17 
HNW 5 4 4 4 5 22 
 
Regarding the question of what to do with the DWMS brand, the option to retain 
the brand scored higher across advisors, clients and value, relative to the options to 
merge/sell.  Retaining the DWMS brand in addition to the SM brand offers more choice, 
 55 
and will appeal to a wider audience of advisors and clients.  The option to merge/sell 
scored higher in BNS’ Framework for Success, as there is only one brand to manage and 
focus on; in addition, the option to sell scored higher in Productivity/Capacity, as capital 
is made available for reinvestment. 
The option to offer only the Employee model to advisors scored higher in 
productivity, relative to offering both advisor models, as all advisors have more tools to 
leverage to increase productivity/capacity (e.g. ‘Team of Experts’, operational support, 
etc.).  The option to offer both the Employee and Independent Agent models scored 
higher in attracting advisors, clients, and value, as advisors have more freedom to choose 
which model is best suited to their strengths and business strategy; again, this will appeal 
to a wider audience of advisors and clients.  Advisors who choose the Independent Agent 
model may be less productive however, as they are not offered the same tools to leverage. 
Adopting a HNW strategic focus for SM only, relative to the status quo, scored 
higher across all criteria.  HNW clients own the majority of investable assets and are the 
fastest growing customer segment.  Targeting HNW customers will lead to greater 
advisor productivity/profitability; and the advisors who are able to meet the needs of 
HNW customers will generally have more credentials, experience, and better skills. 
From Table 4.2, it can be inferred that a HNW focus strategy, a dual advisor 
model, and retaining the DWMS brand are of importance, and may add significant value.  
It is expected that strategic alternatives that incorporate more of these options will score 
higher and warrant closer attention; regardless, several alternatives will be proposed and 
analysed, as it is unclear of what management’s preferences are for the various strategic 
options, nor was P&L data available for a definitive feasibility analysis. 
The following proposed alternatives differ on how they answer the revised 
questions, and are being put forward based on what BNS should consider in order to 
exploit identified opportunities and strengths, while mitigating any weaknesses or threats. 
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4.1 Alternative 1 – Retain DWMS, Employee + Agent Model, Strategy 
Status Quo 
 
Keep both the SM and DWMS brands; keep both the Independent Agent and 
Employee models; and keep SM’s current vision, mission, and strategy. 
 
Under this alternative, advisors and clients may continue to stay with their current 
brand – If so, a DWMS advisor/client remains a DWMS advisor/client; a SM 
advisor/client remains a SM advisor/client.  On-going marketing efforts would continue 
under each brand, respectively; as well, both brands could leverage the parent BNS 
brand.  For example, letterhead, business cards, advertising, brochures, and signage, 
would remain the same under each brand, but both could use the BNS logo/TM.  
Depending on existing and new advisors meeting certain criteria (e.g. AUM, 
revenue, experience, credentials, etc.), and their own business strategy, they will have the 
freedom to choose which model they wish to operate on – Independent Agent or 
Employee.  Back office functions currently provided by DWMS would be (further) 
consolidated with SM’s back office for cost savings.  The best processes and technology 
between the two firms would be retained. 
In terms of strategy, for SM and DWMS, it’s the status quo – “To be the leader in 
retaining, attracting, and rewarding the best growing and highest performing advisors, 
and to be the firm of choice for primary advisors to affluent and HNW clients”; to deliver 
investment advice, money management, and comprehensive wealth management services 
(see Section 2.2). 
 
4.2 Alternative 2 – Retain DWMS, Employee + Agent Model, HNW Focus 
 
Alternative 2 is similar to alternative 1, but SM should narrow its strategic scope 
to HNW clients only, and put more emphasis on the related means. 
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For SM and its advisors, growth bonus, advisor training, and experienced 
recruiting should be targeted towards attracting the HNW client (preferably age 40-60).  
SM should strive to be the leader in planning services and/or fee-based solutions 
(including discretionary portfolio management); and should strengthen the ‘Team of 
Experts’ for advisors to leverage.  Existing SM advisors/clients that don’t conform to the 
new strategy should be transitioned to the bank branches or to DWMS. 
 
4.3 Alternative 3 – Merge DWMS, Employee + Agent Model, Strategy 
Status Quo 
 
Keep the SM brand only; offer both the Independent Agent and Employee model; 
and keep SM’s current strategic scope and means. 
 
Advisors/clients under the DWMS brand would switch to the SM brand, along 
with all future marketing efforts.  All letterhead, business cards, advertising, brochures, 
and signage, etc. would show the SM/BNS brand, logos, and TM’s. 
Depending on existing/new advisors meeting certain criteria (e.g. AUM, revenue, 
experience, credentials, etc.), and their own business strategy, they will have the freedom 
to choose which model they wish to operate on – Independent Agent or Employee model.  
Back office functions currently provided by DWMS would be entirely consolidated with 
SM’s back office for cost savings.  The best processes and technology between the two 
firms would be retained. 
 
4.4 Alternative 4 – Merge DWMS, Employee + Agent Model, HNW Focus 
 
Alternative 4 is similar to alternative 3, but SM should narrow its strategic scope 
to HNW clients only, and put more emphasis on the related means. 
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4.5 Alternative 5 – Merge DWMS, Employee Model, Strategy Status Quo 
 
Keep the SM brand and the Employee model only, and keep SM’s current 
strategic scope and means. 
 
DWM Securities advisors would switch over to SM’s compensation and business 
model, where top-end pay-out is reduced, but all/most operational and marketing 
functions and decisions are standardized and covered by SM.  Back office functions 
currently provided by DWMS would be entirely consolidated with SM’s back office for 
cost savings.  The best processes and technology between the two firms would be 
retained. 
 
4.6 Alternative 6 – Merge DWMS, Employee Model, HNW Focus 
 
Alternative 5, but narrow SM’s strategic scope to HNW clients only, and put 
more emphasis on the related means. 
 
4.7 Alternative 7 – Sell DWMS, Employee Model, Strategy Status Quo 
 
Sell DWMS and use proceeds to build out Alternative 5. 
 
4.8 Alternative 8 – Sell DWMS, Employee Model, HNW Focus 
 
Sell DWMS and use proceeds to build out Alternative 6. 
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The following table summarizes how each alternative answers the three new 
questions posed at the start of the section. 
 
Table 4.3 - Summary of Strategic Alternatives vs. Strategic Options 
 DWMS Advisor Model Scope & Means 
 Retain Merge Sell Employee Agent Status 
Quo 
HNW 
Alt 1 X   X X X  
Alt 2 X   X X  X 
Alt 3  X  X X X  
Alt 4  X  X X  X 
Alt 5  X  X  X  
Alt 6  X  X   X 
Alt 7   X X  X  
Alt 8   X X   X 
 
4.9 Evaluation of Alternatives 
 
Table 4.4 takes the total scores for each strategic option in Table 4.2, and matches 
to the corresponding alternatives (see Table 4.3).  For example, Alternative 1 is 
comprised of the following options: Retain; Employee + Agent; and Status Quo.  The 
total score for each option is added up for each criterion, and these in turn are added up to 
produce a final score for each alternative.  In the following table, the 11 corresponding to 
Alternative 1 and BNS’s Framework for Success is the sum of 3 (Retain), 4 (Employee + 
Agent), and 4 (Status Quo) under the Framework column in Table 4.2.  The process is 
repeated across each row to get a final score for each alternative. 
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Table 4.4 - Alternative and Criteria Fit 
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Alt 1 11 11 11 11 10 54 
Alt 2 12 12 12 12 11 59 
Alt 3 12 10 10 10 10 52 
Alt 4 13 11 11 11 11 57 
Alt 5 12 9 9 9 11 50 
Alt 6 13 10 10 10 12 55 
Alt 7 12 9 9 9 12 51 
Alt 8 13 10 10 10 13 56 
 
Based on Table 4.4, the following alternatives scored higher and will be 
considered for feasibility: 
• Alternative 2 – Retain DWMS, Employee + Agent Model, HNW Focus 
• Alternative 4 – Merge DWMS, Employee + Agent Model, HNW Focus 
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5 Alternative Feasibility Analysis 
 
For each of the alternatives selected for further consideration, feasibility will be 
based on whether SM/DWMS’ internal capabilities are sufficient, or could be made 
sufficient, to implement.  For each alternative, for each capability, an assessment is made 
based on: 
• What is required; 
• Whether there are gaps; 
• What gap-bridging solution is required; and 
• What the cost(s) of the solution may be. 
 
5.1 Alternative 2 – Retain DWMS, Employee + Agent Model, HNW Focus 
 
Table 5.1 - Alternative 2 Gap Analysis 
Capability Requirements Gaps Gap-bridging Costs 
Management 
Preferences  & 
Expertise 
• Maintain two 
brands and two 
advisor models 
• Accept potentially 
lower profitability 
ratios from DWM 
Securities 
• Scotiabank 
looking to 
simplify/reduce 
business lines and 
brands 
• It is believed that 
Employee model 
has higher 
profitability ratios 
• Continue to 
simplify higher 
level business 
lines and brands 
only 
• Treat DWM 
Securities 
advisors as loss 
leaders 
• More business 
planning 
• Potentially lower 
average 
profitability ratios 
• Business 
line/brand 
confusion 
Organization • Maintain 
entrepreneurial 
freedom for 
DWM Securities 
advisors 
• Must allow 
advisors to choose 
their own business 
strategy and 
corresponding 
advisor model 
• Scotiabank 
controls 
operations 
• Not enough 
advisor training 
and practice 
management 
support 
• Prospective client 
net is too large 
• Maintain two 
separate full-
service broker 
business lines and 
brands and leave 
DWM Securities 
as is 
• Maintain middle-
management for 
both 
ScotiaMcLeod 
• More compliance 
violations 
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Capability Requirements Gaps Gap-bridging Costs 
• ScotiaMcLeod to 
target HNW 
clients exclusively 
and DWM 
Securities 
• Narrow growth 
bonus to reward 
HNW client 
acquisition and 
fee-based revenue 
for ScotiaMcLeod 
advisors only 
• Freedom for 
advisors to move 
between 
brands/advisor 
model 
Resources • Develop 
ScotiaMcLeod 
advisor force to 
attract HNW 
clients with 
leading planning 
and fee-based 
services 
• Current ‘Team of 
Experts’ is too 
small 
• Current 
technology is 
somewhat 
fragmented and 
doesn’t efficiently 
support 
discretionary 
portfolio 
management 
• Lack of advisor 
training 
• Expand ‘Team of 
Experts’ to better 
support 
ScotiaMcLeod 
advisors 
• Provide more 
advisor training 
and expand 
practice 
management 
group 
• Develop more 
integrated 
technology 
platform with an 
emphasis on 
supporting 
planning related 
activities and 
discretionary 
portfolio 
management 
• Increase in 
ScotiaMcLeod 
advisor support 
related costs 
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5.2 Alternative 4 – Merge DWMS, Employee + Agent Model, HNW Focus 
 
Table 5.2 - Alternative 4 Gap Analysis 
Capability Requirements Gaps Gap-bridging Costs 
Management 
Preferences  & 
Expertise 
• Maintain two 
separate advisor 
models 
• Accept potentially 
lower profitability 
ratios from 
Independent 
Agent advisors 
• Scotiabank 
looking to 
simplify/reduce 
business lines and 
brands 
• It is believed that 
Employee model 
has higher 
profitability ratios 
• Continue to 
simplify higher 
level business 
lines only 
• Treat Independent 
Agent model 
advisors as loss 
leaders 
• More business 
planning 
• Potentially lower 
average 
profitability ratios 
• Business line 
confusion 
Organization • Maintain 
entrepreneurial 
freedom for 
Independent 
Agent model 
advisors 
• Must allow 
advisors to choose 
their own business 
strategy and 
corresponding 
advisor model 
• Employee model 
advisors to target 
HNW clients 
exclusively 
• Scotiabank 
controls 
operations 
• Not enough 
advisor training 
and practice 
management 
support 
• Prospective client 
net is too large 
• Maintain two 
separate full-
service broker 
business lines and 
leave Independent 
Agent model as is 
• Maintain middle-
management for 
both advisor 
business lines 
• Narrow growth 
bonus to reward 
HNW client 
acquisition and 
fee-based revenue 
for Employee 
model advisors 
only 
• Freedom for 
advisors to move 
between advisor 
models 
• More compliance 
violations 
Resources • Develop 
Employee model 
advisor force to 
attract HNW 
clients with 
leading planning 
and fee-based 
services 
• Current ‘Team of 
Experts’ is too 
small 
• Current 
technology is 
somewhat 
fragmented and 
doesn’t efficiently 
• Expand ‘Team of 
Experts’ to better 
support Employee 
model advisors 
• Provide more 
advisor training 
and expand 
practice 
• Increase in 
Employee model 
advisor support 
related costs 
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Capability Requirements Gaps Gap-bridging Costs 
support 
discretionary 
portfolio 
management 
• Lack of advisor 
training 
management 
group 
• Develop more 
integrated 
technology 
platform with an 
emphasis on 
supporting 
planning related 
activities and 
discretionary 
portfolio 
management 
 
5.3 Recommended Alternative(s) 
 
Each of the alternatives analyzed are feasible.  There are identifiable costs in 
retaining the DWMS brand and Independent Agent model, such as, more corporate 
business planning, potentially lower profitability ratios and the maintenance of more 
middle management.  DWMS advisors would continue to be responsible for all 
operational and marketing costs; however, back-office operations for SM and DWMS can 
be further consolidated for cost savings.  DWMS and SM should be kept distinct and 
separate in order to minimize any advisor confusion and cultural conflict, and enable SM 
to develop its HNW brand. 
The Independent Agent model appears ideal/attractive for advisors who have 
strong operational management capability; are on a lower growth trajectory; want more 
freedom to choose their business strategy (e.g. target customer, direct delivery of 
planning, hiring, etc.); and who have roughly $1 million in gross revenue.  The 
Independent Agent channel effectively gives these advisors the ability to choose how 
they complete and fill the value channel, which could potentially result in lower (or 
higher) costs for the advisor relative to the Employee model. 
The Employee model appears ideal/attractive for advisors who are focused on a 
higher/steeper growth trajectory (including new advisors) and need/want to leverage 
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planning services and the operational management expertise of SM.  ScotiaMcleod 
should look to establish a leading position in planning and fee-based solutions to HNW 
clients.  This will require a larger ‘Team of Experts’ for ScotiaMcLeod advisors to 
leverage; and continued investment in more integrated technology. 
The HNW client segment is expected to grow at the fastest rate, and HNW clients 
between the ages of 40 and 60 also stand to benefit from the transfer of wealth.  Targeting 
HNW clients will allow advisors to be more productive, but in order to attract these 
clients; the value proposition needs to focus on planning and fee-based services and 
solutions. 
Selling DWM Securities and focusing only on the Employee model runs the risk 
of losing related AUM with Dynamic mutual funds, and it ignores that there are right 
advisors who prefer or are more suited to the Independent Agent model.  This will limit 
AUM and revenue growth. 
 
5.3.1 Conclusion 
 
Based on the evaluation of alternatives, and the alternative feasibility analysis, the 
recommended alternative is Alternative 2 – Scotiabank should retain both the DWM 
Securities and ScotiaMcLeod brands and advisor models, respectively.  Scotiabank needs 
to expand its advisor training and practice management programs as this will enable 
advisors to better choose their business strategy and corresponding advisor model. 
DWM Securities will continue to operate as it currently does, but will have the 
benefit of being able to leverage the brand name of Scotiabank.  ScotiaMcLeod needs to 
establish a leadership position – it should narrow its focus to HNW clients and the related 
planning and fee-based services and solutions HNW clients demand.  Any advisor or 
client that doesn’t fit either model should be transitioned to another integrated channel 
(e.g. branch channel, discount brokerage, etc.). 
As a final consideration for further analysis, the exit of HSBC Securities presents 
an opportunity for ScotiaMcLeod, and to a lesser degree DWM Securities, to leverage the 
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international brand of Scotiabank, and target related advisors and clients.  The expansion 
of the ‘Team of Experts’ should include more expertise in servicing new immigrants, and 
it will require a coordinated effort with Scotiabank’s international branches. 
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